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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes deliberate attack missions conducted at the U.S. Army Na-
tional Training Center (NTC) and evaluates the relationship between the operational
graphics used and three unit performance measures of effectiveness (MOE). A meth-
odology for categorizing and evaluating operational graphics is developed along with
frequency of operational graphics usage information. A correlation between unit per-
formance and operational graphics is established by comparing the graphics evaluations
to the measures of effectiveness. Discriminant data analysis techniques attempting to
further define a causal relationship proved inconclusive due to observation sample size
and unquantified concomitant variables.
The methodology and analysis contained in this thesis have application to both the
creation of training standards for improvement of unit performance, and the evaluation
of current operational graphics doctrine. Included within the research are descriptions
of the NTC environment, Combat Training Center Archive, battalion task force organ-
ization, the use of operational graphics to portray deliberate attack missions, and the
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Since Fort Irwin's reactivation in the late seventies and early eighties, The National
Training Center (NTC), located in the Mojave desert in southern California, has served
as the principle training area for tank and mechanized infantry units stationed in the
continental United States. The missions of NTC are twofold. The primary mission is
to prepare units for war through tough, realistic training. The secondary mission is to
serve as a data source for training, doctrine, organization, and equipment improvements.
The focus of training at NTC is at the battalion task force level. Every aspect of
combat operations is evaluated in all doctrinal mission areas. Deploying units face a
highly trained and motivated opposing force which replicates a Soviet-equipped enemy
of up to regimental size.
The Operations Group at NTC oversees the tactical environment to maintain
training realism and to provide feedback to deploying units for the improvement of unit
performance. This feedback is done through the analysis of seven battlefield operating
systems (BOS) which include: command and control; maneuver; fire support; intelli-
gence; air defense; mobility, countermobility, and survivability; and combat service sup-
port.
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Within the command and control BOS, an important component of battlefield suc-
cess, both at NTC and in actual combat is a well thought out, well executed tactical
plan. This plan takes the form of combat orders, the importance of which is stated in
the following:
In order to fight, commanders and their staffs must issue instructions to subor-
dinates. They must communicate how they want operations to be conducted. In-
structions or orders may be issued orally or in writing or by a combination of both.
They may be issued in person or by electronic means. Words may be used as the
principal means to communicate instructions, or sometimes only graphics are used
to represent the intent of the commander. As a general rule, both are used. One
complements the other. In any case, a common language of operational terms and
military symbols is necessary so instructions can be communicated rapidly and with
a minimum risk of misunderstanding. [Ref. 1. p, iii]
Observer Controllers (OCs) at NTC have noted a wide variation in the use of oper-
ational graphics in support of tactical plans among deploying units. Deploying units
also vary in their ability to successfully execute assigned tactical missions. This has led
to the following question. Is there a relationshi " between battlefield success and the
operational graphics which were used during a i.'ission?
The intuitive answer to this question is yes, however; analysis in this area has been
limited to subjective evaluations and individual opinions. The purpose of this thesis is
to present a methodology for evaluating operational graphics, and then apply this same
methodolgy in an attempt to discover the relationship between operational graphics and
unit performance. Analysis in this area may yield training standards which can then be
used to improve unit performance. Additionally, the research conducted may provide
insights for the revision of FM 101-1-5, Operational Terms and Graphics, presently
scheduled for 1991.
The scope of this thesis is limited by the following constraints and assumptions:
* Missions evaluated were conducted in a specific environment with limited types of
terrain.
9 Missions were conducted by only armor and mechanized infantry task forces.
* Only selected deliberate attack missions conducted between 19S6 and 1990 were
evaluated.
* The force data found in the unit take home packages is assumed to be accurate for
the missions which were evaluated.
Any use of the analysis results of this thesis should keep these constraints in nind to
avoid arriving at inaccurate or unfounded conclusions.
C. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS
In order to evaluate the relationship between operational graphics and unit per-
formance, measures must be developed to quantify each variable. For operational
graphics this includes recording the type. quantity, and quality of symbols used. Enu-
merating the type and quantity of symbols used for a given operation is a relatively easy
process. On the other hand, there is no established methodology for qualitatively ana-
lyzing these same symbols. An evaluation procedure is presented in Chapter IV to
handle this problem.
Unit performance is equally difficult to quantify. There are many factors which in-
fluence unit performance. Some of these factors can be readily taken from battle results
in the form of measures of effectivenss MOEs, while other factors may prove to be in-
tangible. The approach of this thesis is to focus on the MOEs while keeping in mind
their limitations in totally describing unit performance (Chapter II1).
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Once both unit performance and operational graphics have been adequately quan-
tified, the following hypothesis will be evaluated for validity: Given a task force delib-
erate attack conducted under NTC conditions, there exists a relationship between the




1. National Training Center
The National Training Center (NTC) is located in the Mojave Desert at Fort
Irwin, halfway between Los Angeles, California and Las Vegas, Nevada. The Fort Irwin
reservation covers approximately 640,000 acres of land; roughly two-thirds of which is
navigable by the tracked and wheeled vehi!es of the United States Army. For training
purposes, NTC is divided into three corridors along natural terrain boundaries. This is
shown in Figure 1 on page 5. The northern corridor is principally used for live fire ex-
ercises, while the central and southern corridors are exclusively used for maneuver
training.
NTC has two primary missions. The first is to provide tough, realistic combined
arms training at the battalion level. The second mission is to provide a data source for
training, doctrine, organization, and equipment improvements [Ref. 2: p. 13]. Training
is conducted on a rotational basis, with 14 rotations per fiscal year. The forces involved
in each rotation vary; however, most often they consist of a brigade headquarters, two
armor or mechanized infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a support battalion.
These units deploy to NTC by air, rail and convoy from almost every major Army in-
stallation within the continental United States. The opposing forces (OPFOR) arrayed
against these deploying units are elements of the 177th Armor Brigade.
The OPFOR replicates Soviet ground forces from a motorized rifle company
up to a motorized rifle regiment. A concise description of these forces and their equip-
ment can be found in [Ref. 2: pp. 15-16]. The OPFOR has several significant advan-
tages over deploying units. As a tenant unit of Fort Irwin, the OPFOR is exceptionally
familiar with the terrain in which maneuver training is conducted. This knowledge is
further enhanced by the battle experience which is gained through repeated battles over
the same general pieces of terrain.
2. Mechanized and Armor Task Forces
The units deploying for training at NTC are often referred to as the Blue Force.
Each of the Blue Force battalions is task organized to form two battalion task forces.
A battalion task force is task organized by combining tank and mechanized infantry
companies under a single battalion commander to conduct specific operations
4
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Figure 1. National Training Center Schemiatic
[duef. 1: p. 1-9]. A battalion task force usually consists of four or five maneuver
companies. These companies can be mixed in varying proportions of armor, mechanized
infantry, or anti-armor companies. An example of a mechanized infantry task force is
shown in Figure 2 on page 6. Unit symbols are used to represent each level of organ-
ization.
3. NTC Rotation Phases
Typical NTC rotations are separated into three phases. Each task force con-
ducts battalion force-on-force, battalion live fire, and brigade rorce-on-force operations
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BAIALION ARMOR BA'TAUON
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M-3 Infantry Fightng Vehicle no M-2's. It would have 14 M-1 13 Armored
M-901: Improved TOW Vehide Personnel Carriers in place of the M-2s.
Figure 2. Mechanized Infantry Task Force
over a 14 day period. The sequence of these phases may vary, however; Table 1 on page
7 is representative of a typical rotation. Definitions for the specific missions can be
found in Appendix A.
Table 1. TYPICAL NTC ROTATION
TRAINING DAY ARMOR TASK FORCE MECHANIZED TASK
MISSION FORCE MISSION
T-2 Arrive / Draw Equipment
T-1 Deploy to Training
FORCE-ON-FORCE LIVE FIRE
1 Movement to Contact Live Fire Preparation
2 Deliberate Attack Live Fire Preparation
3 Prepare Defense Defense
4 Defense in Sector Movement to Contact
5 Deliberate Attack Prepare Battle Position
LIVE FIRE FORCE-ON-FORCE
6 Live Fire Preparation Defend a Battle Position
7 Live Fire Preparation Defend a Battle Position
8 Defense Deliberate Attack
9 Counterattack Deliberate Attack
10 Prepare Battle Position Prepare Defense
BRIGADE FORCE-ON-FORCE
11 Prepare Battle Position Defense in Sector
12 Defend Battle Position Counterattack
13 Deliberate Attack Deliberate Attack




r + 3 Equipment Turn-in
T+4 Redeployment to Home Station
B. DATA COLLECTION FOCUS
1. General
In an effort to focus in on the influence of operational graphics on unit per-
formance, the available data was screened against a specific set of attributes. The ra-
tionale for each of these screens is explained below.
2. Daylight Deliberate Attacks
The task force mission which was selected for evaluation was the deliberate
attack. A deliberate attack is an attack planned and carefully coordinated with all
concerned elements based on a thorough reconnaisance, evaluation of all intelligence
and relative combat strength, analysis of arious courses of action, and other factors
7
affecting the situation [Ref. 1: p. 1-8]. The process of planning and executing a
deliberate attack provides a wealth of varied operational graphics for evaluation. A
majority of deploying units must execute this mission during an NTC rotation, thereby
providing a large sample size to draw from. The reason for further restricting the data
set to daylight deliberate attacks is based on the fact that different symbols are used for
night operations due to limited visibility.
3. Operation Overlays
Only those missions for which an operation overlay could be found were evalu-
ated. While it is possible to find other records of the operational graphics used by a unit,
these records are transcriptions and often incomplete. An example of this type of tran-
scription is the computer generated graphics which are presented on the after action re-
view video tapes. The completeness of these graphics was inconsistent due to the
requirement to display only those portions of the plan necessary to describe what had
or had not occurred during a given battle. Supporting overlays such as those produced
for intelligence, combat service support, and fire support were not evaluated.
4. Battalion Force-on-Force Battles
As can be seen in Table 1 on page 7, there may be several deliberate attacks
conducted during an NTC rotation. Only deliberate attacks from the battalion force-
on-force training period were selected for evaluation. Additionally, if a task force con-
ducted more than one deliberate attack during this phase, only the first mission was
collected. The selection of the first deliberate attack conducted by a unit during battal-
ion force-on-force operations provided the most accurate picture of the level of training
of the unit. Missions conducted during brigade force-on-force operations were elimi-
nated because of the influence of the higher headquarters on the task force graphics.
5. Unit Types
The sample population was further restricted by the type of units that were
evaluated. Only deliberate attacks conducted by armor or mechanized infantry task
forces were included in the data set. Armored cavalry units, motorized infantry units,
and aviation units were eliminated due to the large differences in equipment and organ-
ization. Both modernized units (equipped with the M-l Main Battle Tank and M2,3
Bradley Fighting Vehicle) and non-modernized units (equipped with the M l 13 Armored
Personnel Carrier and M60A3 Tank) were included in the data set. Additionally, delib-
erate attacks conducted during lteavy, Light rotations were also included when these
attacks in~olbed a mechanized infantry or armor task force. Deliberate attacks by light
8
infantry task forces were excluded from evaluation for equipment and organizational
differences.
6. Southern Corridor Battles
Only deliberate attacks conducted in the southern corridor of NTC were selected
in an effort to minimize the effect of terrain on unit performance. It was not possible





The data was collected at the Combat Training Center (CTC) archive at the
Army Research Institute - Presidio of Monterey (ARI-POM). The mission of the CTC
archive is to provide users the ability to exploit data derived from CTC experience for
the improvement of Doctrine, Training, Organization, Material, and Leadership
(DTOML) [Ref. 3: Tab A].
b. Facilities
The CTC archive has both digital and non-digital data. The digital database
includes unit take home packages (containing a written evaluation of what the unit did),
battlefield events, and battle replay. The digital data may be accessed through a VAX
computer network or through personal computer. Non-digital data sources include
written copies of the unit take home packages, training and e aluation outlines, opera-
tion orders and overlays, after action review (AAR) video tapes, and radio recordings
of 80 channels. Nearly everthing that a deploying unit does during an NTC rotation is
recorded for future analysis.
The three primary facilities of the CTC Archive are the digital data archive,
non-digital data archive, and the Combat Operations Research Facility (CORF). The
CORF is visited by agencies throughout the Army for analysis of DTOML issues, and
contains all of the equipment necessary to combine the varied data sources into a co-
herent study.
The data which was used in this thesis was taken entirely from the non-
digital data archive. The primary data sources exploited in this area 'Aere operation or-
ders and overlays, unit take home packages, and video AAR tapes.
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2. Operation Orders
The operation orders were the actual orders issued by the Blue Force units
during their rotations. These orders are maintained in chronological folders and envel-
opes by rotation.
3. Operation Overlays
The operation overlays were found in two formats. In roughly 25% of the
missions evaluated, the actual acetate overlay was found. These overlays were rolled up,
labelled, and stacked next to the operation order files. The remainder of the overlays
evaluated were paper copies produced by running the original acetate overlay through
a blue print machine at NTC. The paper overlays were placed in the operation order
files. These overlays had to be traced onto acetate in order to place them over the NTC
maps for evaluation.
4. Unit Take Home Packages
The unit take home packages are maintained in loose-leaf binders and are stored
by rotation. The take home package is broken down into a general summary, mission
statements and commander's intent, lessons learned, and statistical analysis. Informa-
tion taken from the statistical analysis section included task force battle losses,
companyteam battle losses, weapons systems causing OPFOR casualties, and battle
loss ratios.
5. AAR Tapes
The AAR video tapes are also stored chronologically by rotation. They were
viewed in order to gain an understanding of each evaluated Blue Force mission and to
clarify the type and purpose of the graphics utilized. These tapes focus on, but are not
limited to, operation orders, initial contact with the OPFOR, lessons learned, and battle
surmnaries.
D. SELECTED DATA
In an effort to examine the most current operations at NTC, data was collected in
reverse chronological order. Starting with rotation 90-4 (January 1990), each rotation
was screened until a total of 30 observations were obtained. The number of observations
was set at 30 based on requirements for statistical significance and time limitations.
1. Data Reduction
After eliminating brigade and multiple deliberate attacks by the same task force,
a total of 88 possible missions had to be screened before 30 complete obser ations were
found. The breakdown of the 58 missions eliminated are listed below.
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* 12 Incorrect mission type (Night and Hasty attacks)
* 26 Deliberate attacks with missing operation overlays
* 10 Incorrect unit type
* 10 Deliberate attacks outside the southern corridor
It should be noted that the non-digital data archive was undergoing a period of
reorganization during the time that the data was collected. There has been a lack of
standardization both in what non-digital data is to be sent to the archive from the CTC,
as well as what data is to be maintained in the archive and for how long. This lack of
standardization has resulted in a loss of information in some areas. The fact that 30%
of the operation overlays were missing is an example of this loss.
2. Mission Listing
The missions selected for analysis are shown in the Table 2 on page 12. Despite
the fact that a large number of observations were eliminated in the data reduction
process, the final sample is representative of the three year period covered. Almost every
armor and mechanized infantry division and separate brigade is represented. An even
distribution of modernized and non-modernized units can be found along with a Army
National Guard, or Roundout, unit. Every month of the year is represented except for
May.
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Table 2. DELIBERATE ATTACK MISSION LIST
NO. ROT DATE TASK NTC ROTATION
FORCE LOCATION TYPE
1 87-03 28 Nov 86 Armor Australia Non-Modernized
2 87-03 02 Dec 86 Mech Siberia Non-Modernized
3 87-05 07 Feb 87 Armor .Australia Modernized
4 87-06 03 Mar 87 Armor Australia Non-Modernized
5 87-06 04 Mar 87 Armor Australia Non-Modernized
6 87-07 28 Mar 87 Mech Australia Modernized
7 87-07 31 Mar 87 Armor Red Lake Pass Modernized
8 87-08 21 Apr 87 Armor Australia Non-Modernized
9 87-12 17 Aug 87 Mech Red Lake Pass Non-Modernized
10 87-14 22 Sep 87 Mech Bowling Alley Non-Modernized
11 87-14 29 Sep 87 Armor Whale Gap Non-Modernized
12 88-02 13 Nov 87 Mech Hill 909 North Non-Modernized
13 88-05 07 Feb 88 Mech Hill 909 South Modernized
14 88-06 29 Feb 88 Mcch Australia Heavv,Light (NM)
15 89-01 16 Oct 88 Armor Whale Gap Hteavy/Light (NM)
16 89-01 19 Oct 88 Mech Hill 909 North Heavy,'Light (NM)
17 89-02 08 Nov 88 Mech Whale Gap Non-Modernized
18 89-02 14 Nov 88 Armor OP 2 Non-Modernized
19 89-03 01 Dec 88 Armor Great Sandy Wash Heavy/Light (M)
20 89-04 11 Jan 89 Armor Whale Gap Modernized
21 89-10 05 Jun 89 Mech Red Lake Pass Non-Modernized
22 89-10 10 Jun 89 Armor Red Lake Pass Roundout (NM)
23 8Q-11 11 Jul 89 Armor Red Lake Pass Modernized
24 89-12 06 Aug 89 Armor Langford Wells Heavy Light (M)
25 89-12 10 Aug 89 Mech OP 1 Heavy,'Light (M)
26 89-13 30 Aug 89 Armor Red Lake Pass Non-Modernizcd
27 89-13 02 Sep 89 Mech No Name Valley Non-Modernized
28 89-14 23 Sep 89 Armor Whale Gap Modernized
29 89-14 26 Sep 89 Mech OP 1 Modernized
30 90-04 16 Jan 90 Armor OP 1 Modernized
3. Mission Statistics
Of the 30 deliberate attacks evaluated 17 were conducted by armor and 13 by
mechanized infantry. 12 were conducted by modernized and 18 by non-modernized
units. Six of the missions were conducted during heavy,light rotations. The breakout
by calender years was two in 1986, ten in 1987, seven in 1988, ten in 1989, and one in
1990.
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III. UNIT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. GENERAL
There are many components wihich contribute to unit performance. Some factors,
such as starting force ratios, number of friendly systems surviving, and number of enemy
systems destroyed are easy to quantify. Factors such as leadership, experience, training,
and motivation are more elusive. In an ideal analysis of operational graphics and unit
performance all contributing variables would be quantified and included. The scope of
this thesis does not permit such an evaluation. As a result, only non-subjective measures
were used in the evaluation of unit performance. This evaluation was done by looking
at starting force ratios, and three quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOEs).
Many different systems participate in a task force deliberate attack from the indi-
vidual soldier up to the main battle tank. The most reliable data available from the
statistics portion of the take home package has to do with major tank killing systems.
For these systems, the exact number of systems starting, des.ro~ed, and surviving is re-
corded by system type. The MOEs are derived from these numbers. For Blue Force
units the systems considered were tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV), and Tube-
launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missle carriers. Tanks and BMPs (the
Soviet equivalent to the BFV) were considered for the OPFOR.
B. FORCE RATIO
Army doctrine states that deliberate attocks are ideally conducted with a minimum
force ratio of three friendly systems to every enemy system. The force ratios are dis-
played in Table 3 on page 14. The force ratio for each observation i, was calculated
using the following formula:
BLUE(Tanksl + BFVs, + TOIVs)StartingFORCE RATO 2  OPFOR (Tanks + BMPsi) Starting
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Table 3. DELIBERATE ATTACK FORCE RATIOS
NO. ROT DATE BLUE OPFOR BLUE OPFOR FORCENOOT DT TNK BFV TOW TNK BMP TOTAL TOTAL RATIO
1 87-03 28 Nov 86 28 0 9 4 10 37 14 2.64
2 87-03 02 Dec 86 22 0 15 4 11 37 15 2.47
3 87-05 07 Feb 87 26 21 0 8 15 47 23 2.04
4 87-06 03 Mar 87 28 0 9 4 12 37 16 2.31
5 87-06 04 Mar 87 25 0 8 4 12 33 16 2.06
6 87-07 28 Mar 87 23 28 10 8 16 61 24 2.54
7 87-07 31 Mar 87 25 28 0 8 16 53 24 2.21
8 87-08 21 Apr 87 40 0 3 4 15 43 19 2.26
9 87-12 17 Aug 87 22 0 11 4 14 33 18 1.83
10 87-14 22 Sep 87 27 0 17 4 9 44 13 3.38
11 87-14 29 Sep 87 29 0 7 4 12 36 16 2.25
12 88-02 13 Nov 87 24 0 15 8 20 39 28 1.39
13 88-05 07 Feb 88 25 31 10 8 16 66 24 2.75
14 88-06 29 Feb 88 24 0 18 4 14 42 18 2.33
15 89-01 16 Oct 88 26 0 10 12 10 36 22 1.64
16 89-01 19 Oct 88 24 0 13 13 23 37 36 1.03
17 89-02 08 Nov 88 25 0 17 12 23 42 35 1.20
18 89-02 14 Nov 88 24 0 9 12 IS 33 30 1.10
19 89-03 01 Dec 88 24 26 0 16 29 50 45 1.11
20 89-04 11 Jan 89 38 16 0 22 38 54 60 0.90
21 89-10 05 Jun 89 23 0 11 8 10 34 18 1.89
22 89-10 10 Jun 89 26 0 10 12 24 36 36 1.00
23 89-11 11 Jul 89 32 20 0 21 38 52 59 0.88
24 89-12 06 Aug 89 28 20 0 21 24 48 45 1.07
25 89-12 10 Aug 89 22 25 11 6 18 58 24 2.42
26 89-13 30 Aug 89 38 0 0 19 32 38 51 0.75
27 89-13 02 Sep 89 34 0 0 IS 27 34 45 0.76
28 89-14 23 Sep 89 24 28 0 13 21 52 34 1.53
29 89-14 26 Sep 89 11 41 8 19 34 60 53 1.13
30 90-04 16 Jan 90 20 22 3 15 16 45 31 1.45
The mean force ratio was 1.74 to 1. The range of values was from .75 to 1 up to
3.38 to 1. There are several reasons for this wide range of values. The most important
reason was a change in OPFOR representation which occured in 1987.
The equivalent OPFOR organization to the task force is the Motorized Rifle Bat-
talion (MRB). The OPFOR MRB has a total of 45 tank killing systems divided up into
13 tanks and 32 BMPs. The MRB has three Motorized Rifle Companies (MRC), each
with four tanks and ten BMPs. The MRB normally defends with two MRCs forward
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and the third in reserve. Up until 1987, an attacking task force would only face one
idependent MRC, or an MRB with two notional (imaginary) MRC's. This philosophy
was changed in order to more realistically portray the Soviet threat. Attacking task
forces would now face the entire MRB, and be told to focus the attack on one MRC.
Very few units have been successful in locating and isolating their efforts on one MRC,
and more often than not end up taking on the entire MRB. This has lead to an increase
in the number of enemy systems which the task force must fight, and thereby decreases
the force ratio.
Other factors which impact on the force ratio include the composition of the Blue
Force, the maintenance posture of the units (vehicles which are inoperative do not par-
ticipate), and the area of operations for the mission.
C. MOE 1: DESTROY MOE
MOE 1, the Destroy MOE, measures the percentage of OPFOR destroyed. The
values for MOE 1 are shown in Table 4 on page 16. The equation used to calculate
MOE I for each observation i is:
OPFOR (Tanks1 + BMPs) DestroyedMOE 1, = OPFOR (Tanks i + BMPsi) Starting x 100
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Table 4. OPFOR MISSION DATA AND DESTROY MOE
NO. ROT DATE TANK BMP MOE I
Start Lost Start Lost (%)
1 87-03 28 Nov 86 4 2 10 8 71.43
2 87-03 02 Dec 86 4 0 11 6 40.00
3 87-05 07 Feb 87 8 7 15 8 65.22
4 87-06 03 Mar 87 4 2 12 9 68.75
5 87-06 04 Mar 87 4 2 12 9 68.75
6 87-07 28 Mar 87 8 8 16 16 100.00
7 87-07 31 Mar 87 8 4 16 12 66.67
8 87-08 21 Apr 87 4 1 15 7 42.11
9 87-12 17 Aug 87 4 3 14 13 88.89
10 87-14 22 Sep 87 4 4 9 8 92.31
11 87-14 29 Sep 87 4 4 12 11 93.75
12 88-02 13 Nov 87 8 1 20 4 17.86
13 88-05 07 Feb 88 8 2 16 6 33.33
14 88-06 29 Feb 88 4 4 14 8 66.67
15 89-01 16 Oct 88 12 8 10 3 50.00
16 89-01 19 Oct 88 13 4 23 9 36.11
17 89-02 08 Nov 88 12 4 23 17 60.00
18 89-02 14 Nov 88 12 5 18 11 53.33
19 89-03 01 Dec 88 16 4 29 7 24.44
20 89-04 11 Jan 89 22 5 38 9 23.33
21 89-10 .05 Jun 89 8 3 10 7 55.56
22 89-10 10 Jun 89 12 5 24 14 52.78
23 89-11 11Jul 89 21 7 38 9 27.12
24 89-12 06 Aug 89 21 2 24 4 13.33
25 89-12 10 Aug 89 6 6 18 16 91.67
26 89-13 30 Aug 89 19 6 32 10 31.37
27 89-13 02 Sep 89 18 1 27 5 13.33
28 89-14 23 Sep 89 13 7 21 16 67.65
29 89-14 26 Sep 89 19 3 34 5 15.09
30 90-04 16 Jan 90 15 3 16 4 22.58
A mean of 51.78% of the OPFOR was destroyed across the 30 missions. The range of
values was from 13.33% to 100%.
D. MOE 2: SURVIVAL MOE
MOE 2, the Survival MOE, measures the percentage of Blue Force surviving. This
is analagous to how well the Blue Force protected its own force during the attack.
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The following equation was used to calculate MOE 2 for each observation i:
BLUE (Tanks, + BFVs + TO 11"s) Surviving
MOE 2 = BLUE(Tanks + BFVs + TO1s) Starting x 00
These values are displayed in Table 5.
Table 5. BLUEFORCE MISSION DATA AND SURVIVAL MOE
NO. ROT DATE TANK IFV TOW MOE 2Start Lost Start Lost Start ]Lost (%)
1 87-03 28 Nov 86 28 19 0 0 9 4 37.84
2 87-03 02 Dec 86 22 18 0 0 15 0 51.35
3 87-05 07 Feb 87 26 15 21 20 0 0 25.53
4 87-06 03 Mar 87 28 21 0 0 9 5 29.73
5 87-06 04 Mar 87 25 18 0 0 8 3 36.36
6 87-07 28 Mar 87 23 16 28 22 10 7 26.23
7 87-07 31 Mar 87 25 25 28 21 0 0 13.21
8 87-08 21 Apr 87 40 37 0 0 3 1 11.63
9 87-12 17 Aug 87 22 21 0 0 11 3 27.27
10 87-14 22 Sep 87 27 22 0 0 17 10 27.27
11 87-11 29 Sep 87 29 26 0 0 7 2 22.22
12 88-02 13 Nov 87 24 22 0 0 15 5 30.77
13 88-05 07 Feb 88 25 14 31 27 10 4 31.82
14 88-06 29 Feb 88 24 19 0 0 18 5 42.86
15 89-01 16 Oct 88 26 24 0 0 10 8 11.11
16 89-01 19 Oct 88 24 17 0 0 13 7 35.14
17 89-02 08 Nov 88 25 25 0 0 17 11 14.29
18 89-02 14 Nov 88 24 21 0 0 9 7 15.15
19 89-03 01 Dec 88 24 22 26 18 0 0 20.00
20 89-04 11 Jan 89 38 38 16 16 0 0 0.00
21 89-10 05 Jun 89 23 23 0 0 11 9 5.88
22 89-10 10 Jun 89 26 23 0 0 10 8 13.89
23 89-11 11 Jul 89 32 28 20 18 0 0 11.54
24 89-12 06 Aug 89 28 27 10 12 0 0 2.50
25 89-12 10 Aug 89 22 16 25 15 11 8 32.76
26 89-13 30 Aug 89 38 37 0 0 0 0 2.63
27 89-13 02 Sep 89 34 33 0 0 0 0 2.94
28 89-14 23 Sep 89 24 20 28 26 0 0 11.54
29 89-14 26 Sep 89 11 9 41 34 8 4 21.67
30 90-04 16 Jan 90 1 20 20 22 13 3 I 24.44
Over the 30 battles, the mean number of Blue Force surviving was 21.32/o. The values
ranged from no survivors up to 42.86%.
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E. DELIBERATE ATTACK MOE
In a deliberate attack, the commander is concerned with both preserving his forces
and destroying the enemy. Depending on whether he is told to seize, secure, or clear an
objective, the commander may place more emphasis on one area or the other. For the
purposes of this analysis, preservation of the force and the destruction of the enemy were
given equal weight. The Deliberate Attack MOE, MOE 3, is an average of the Destroy
MOE (MOE 1) and the Survival MOE (MOE 2):
Enemy Destroyed + Friendly Survived
MOE 31 = 2
The results of these calculations can be found in Table 6 on page 19. The range of
scores for MOE 3 were from 7.92 to 63.11. The mean score was 36.55. With the delib-
erate attack MOE, the score of 50 can be viewed as a break point. By attaining a score
above 50, the Blue Force has done better than the OPFOR at destroying enemy and
friendly survival. A score below 50 indicates a better overall OPFOR performance in the
above areas.
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Table 6. DELIBERATE ATTACK MOE
NO. ROT DATE FORCE DESTROY SURVIVE DEL ATKRATIO MOE I MOE 2 MOE 3
1 87-03 28 Nov 86 2.64 71.43 37.84 54.63
2 87-03 02 Dec 86 2.47 40.00 51.35 45.68
3 87-05 07 Feb 87 2.04 65.22 25.53 45.37
4 87-06 03 Mar 87 2.31 68.75 29.73 49.24
5 87-06 04 Mar 87 2.06 68.75 36.36 52.56
6 80-07 28 Mar 87 2.54 99.99 26.23 63.11
7 87-07 31 Mar 87 2.21 66.67 13.21 39.94
8 87-08 21 Apr 87 2.26 42.11 11.63 26.87
9 87-12 17 Aug 87 1.83 88.89 27.27 58.08
10 87-14 22 Sep 87 3.38 92.31 27.27 59.79
11 87-14 29 Sep 87 2.25 93.75 22.22 57.99
12 88.02 13 Nov 87 1.39 17.86 30.77 24.31
13 88-05 07 Feb 88 2.75 33.33 31.82 32.58
14 88-06 29 Feb 88 2.33 66.67 42.86 54.76
15 89-01 16 Oct 88 1.64 50.00 11.11 30.56
16 89-01 19 Oct 88 1.03 36.11 35.14 35.62
17 89-02 08 Nov 88 1.20 60.00 14.29 37.14
18 89-02 14 Nov 88 1.10 53.33 15.15 34.24
19 89-03 01 Dec 88 1.11 24.44 20.00 22.22
20 89-04 11 Jan 89 0.90 23.33 0.00 11.67
21 89-10 05 Jun 89 1.89 55.56 5.88 30.72
22 89-10 10 Jun 89 1.00 52.78 13.89 33.33
23 89-11 11Jul 89 0.88 27.12 11.54 19.33
24 89-12 06 Aug 89 0.89 13.33 2.5 7.92
25 89-12 10 Aug 89 2.42 91.67 32.76 62.21
26 89-13 30 Aug 89 0.75 31.37 2.63 17.00
27 89-13 02 Sep 89 0.76 13.33 2.94 8.14
28 89-14 23 Sep 89 1.53 67.65 11.54 39.59
29 89-14 26 Sep 89 1.13 15.09 21.67 18.38
30 90-04 16 Jan 90 1.45 22.58 24.44 23.51
F. FORCE RATIO CORRELATION
Prior to investigating the possible relationships between the three measures of ef-
fectiveness and the graphics evaluations in Chapter IV, the possible relationship between
the MOEs and the starting force ratios had to be explored. Each of the MOEs were
plotted against the starting force ratios in a scatter plot. The best fitted line was ob-
tained using ordinary least squares regression as shown in Figure 3 on page 20 and Ta-
ble 7 on page 20.
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Figure 3. Force Ratio Scatter Plots
Table 7. FORCE RATIO REGRESSION ANALYSIS
MOE NAME R2  Adjusted R1 F Value Prob > F
DESTROY 0.4714 0.4525 24.969 0.0001
Ii iDiSTROY
I SURVIVE 0.3725 0.3501 16.624 0.0003
1 DEL ATK 0.6138 0.6000 44.496 0.0001
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These results show a statistical relationship between each of the measures of effec-
tiveness and the starting force ratios. The equation for each of the fitted lines was of the
form:
y = a +bx + e
The depenedent variable, y, is the MOE. The x variable is the force ratio, and b is the
regression coefficient which describes the magnitude of the force ratio's contribution to
the MOE. The intercept term, a, has little meaning; it represents the linear extension
of the curve fit for force ratio equal to zero. It matters not if it is included in the com-
putation of the residuals. The residuals, r, represent all of the other aspects of unit
performance contributing to the MOE. By rewriting the equation we can remove the
force ratio effects from the MOE. This process was used on each of the measures of
effectiveness prior to further analysis.
r = y - bx
There are many additiona! factors which impact on unit performance. As was stated
at the outset of this chapter, only those areas where quantifiable subjective data was
readily available were used. Measurements which would have aided in reducing the
residuals of the MOEs for further analysis were the amount of planning time the units
had to prepare for the mission, the number of leaders with NTC experience, and a wide
range of statistics on unit training such as Skill Qualification Tests (SQT) and Army
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) scores from home station. Further quali-
fications on the research presented in this thesis will be addressed in the conclusions and
recommendations chapter.
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IV. OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS EVALUATION
A. GENERAL
Operational graphics are divided into three major categories: basic symbols, sym-
bols for the ground environment, and battlefield activities. Some symbols appear in
more than one category based on their usage. Basic symbols are further subdivided into
units, installations, and equipment. They are used to identify friendly and enemy lo-
cations on the ground. Symbols for the ground environment are used to quickly and
accurately portray battle activity with a minimum of misunderstanding [Ref. 1: p. 2-261.
The categories for these types of symbols includes present and proposed locations,
points, lines, areas, obstacles, crossings, movements, indirect fire planning, and tactical
deception. Battlefield activities includes offensive and defensive symbols. These symbols
are used to graphically portray specific missions which may be assigned to a unit.
B. SYMBOLS USED FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Individual symbols provide bits of information. By combining the proper symbols
it is possible to convey meaning and intent for a given tactical operation, Since tthis re-
search is focused on the deliberate attack, it is important to understand the scope of the
symbology for offensive operations. fhe placement of symbols in the offense is deter-
mined by a grid reference beginning with the start of movement and ending at an ob-
jective or other control measure [Ref. 1: p. 2-63]. Under the category of battlefield









* Follow and support
* Follow and assume main attack
* Infiltration lane
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* Landing zone (LZ) Drop zone (DZ)
* Limit of advance (LOA)
• Line of contact (LC)
o Line of departure (LD)
* Objective
• Zone of action
These symbols are not meant to be an all inclusive list, nor are they symbols which
must be used. The commander must analyze his requirements using METT-T (Mission,
Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Time available) in order to determine which symbology best
represents what he intends to do with his subordinate elements. The impact of METT-T
analysis can be seen in the following examples.
If the mission of the task force is to destroy the enemy, then the commander may
not want to use the bypass symbol. This symbol defines how easy or difficult it is to
avoid enemy forces in order to maintain momentum. The landing zone and drop zone
are used when soldiers are moved using air assets. The commander who does not have
helicopters as part of his troops would not use these symbols. Some symbols are elimi-
nated based on the aspects of the terrain in which a unit is operating. There are no rivers
in the desert at NTC. You would not expect to see the symbol for a bridgehead line,
which defines the area that units occupy following a river crossing.
C. TASK FORCE DELIBERATE ATTACK EXAMPLE
In order to understand the analysis which follows, the reader must first develop a
conceptual understanding of task force operational graphics for a deliberate attack. To
aid in this process, a simple example is included in Figure 4 on page 24. It should be
noted that this example is not intended to be a model for future operations overlays,
rather it is a simple representation of some of the symbols used in offensive operations.
Referring to the figure, symbol I is a zone of action. The zone of action is a tactical
subdivision of a larger area, the responsibility for which is assigned to a tactical unit
[Ref. 1: p. 1-75]. The zone of action is made up of lateral and rear boundaries. The
unit size indicator on these boundaries always reflects the largest of the two adjacent
units, hence the X for the two boundaries with brigade units, and 1I for the boundary
with the armor battalion. In the example, the zone of action is the responsibility of Task
Force 3-28. From the unit designations on the rear boundary, at the left, it can be seen
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Figure 4. Example Deliberate Attack Graphics
that the element to the rear of the task force is the 1st Brigade. On the left of the task
force is the 4th Brigade, and to the right is the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor.
Symbols 2 and 3 are combined to properly represent the task force assembly area,
AA LION. Symbol 2 is the representation of 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry (Mechanized),
and the box over the unit size designation indicates that the unit has been task organized
with armor in order to form a task force. Symbol 3 defines the assembly area where the
task force prepares for its next mission. There are many variants for representing a
battalion assembly area. It would be correct to portray it in such a way as to define the
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locations of all subordinate units, or to divide the area into smaller, company-sized as-
sembly areas with their own designations.
The next three symbols are used to prescribe the route the unit will take as it moves
to the attack position. These symbols are used to provide controlled, coordinated
movements and to avoid disorganization as the unit moves from one point on the bat-
tlefield to another. Symbol 4 is the start point (SP). This is an identifiable location on
the ground where the units begin their movements. The units then travel along route
DOG, symbol 5, until they reach symbol 6, the release point (RP). Throughout the
movement, the subordinate elements are under task force control. During this type of
movement units generally adhere to movement tables which specify the times for cross-
ing the SP, RP, and other points along the route.
Attack Position TIGER, symbol 7, is the last position occupied by the task force
prior to entering enemy territory [Ref. I: p. 1-8]. The attack position is used to coor-
dinate and synchronize forces in order to prepare them for possible enemy contact.
Units organize into the order of movement and designated movement formations in the
attack position so that as they cross the line of departure, they are able to move rapidly
and with a minimum amount of delay. The line of departure, symbol 8, is a line desig-
nated for the coordinated commitment of attacking units at a specified time
[Ref. 1: p. 1-42]. The actual time at which units cross the LD is specified in the oper-
ation order. The crossing of the LD is the traditional initiation of the attack.
As the units move forward towards their objective, several types of symbols are used
to report friendly locations and coordinate movement Symbols 9 and 10, the phase line
and checkpoint respectively, are examples of these type of symbols. The example in the
figure has two phase lines, PL BLUE and PL RED. Phase lines are oriented to promi-
nent terrain features such as hills, roads, and streams. This makes them easy to recog-
nize during movement and helps to alleviate confusion over subordinate unit locations.
Checkpoints, such as 12, 13, and 14 in the figure, are also oriented to recognizable ter-
rain for this same reason [Ref. 1: p. 1-13].
The lateral movement boundaries for the task force are defined by the axis of ad-
vance, symbols 11, 12, and 15. The axis of advance not only por t rays where the task
force is going to go, but also what the commander's intent is during movement. The axis
of advance shows how the commander intends to approach the enemy and how the task
force will use the terrain to its advantage as the unit moves. The commander also des-
ignates his main effort bN using a double-headed arrow to indicate the main attack axis.
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This is shown in the figure as Axis HAMMER. By default, Axis ANVIL is the sup-
porting attack in the example.
Some symbols are used to define actual battlefield missions as shown by symbol 13,
support-by-fire position DELTA. This symbol has two components. The first compo-
nent is the location from which the unit will fire and is defined by the bracket. The
second is the arrow which provides the orientation for the occupying unit's fires. Addi-
tional coordination symbols are often used in the objective area for the shifting of these
fires as the attack progresses. Such symbols have been onitted in this example for the
sake of simplicity.
Symbol 14, assault position PUMA is the last covered and concealed position prior
to the objective. The task force would organize for its final assault in this position. This
organization would include grouping the subordinate units into lead and supporting
units, as well as providing time to allow indirect and direct supporting fires to be brought
into position. In the example, the task force would use the assault position as a holding
area until units were preparcd in support-by-lire position DELTA.
Gaining control of symbol 16, objective PREY, is the attacking force's goal. Ob-
jectives can be teirain-oriented or enemy-oriented depending on the task force mission.
Often times a comnmander will establish intermediate objectives prior to the final objec-
tive. This is usually done when the commander has gained some sort of intelligence on
possible forward enemy locations or when a particular piece of terrain dominates the
maneuver area. The objective in the example is in its simplest Form. As an assembly
area can be subdivided, so too can the objective. This is often done by assigning com-
pany objectives within the battalion objective, or by using graphic control measures,
such as phase lines or unit boundaries. One such symbol used to control forces in the
objective area is symbol 17, the limit of advance (LOA). This line is oriented to terrain
features and marks the boundary across which the attacking force may not attack. The
limits of advance can be also used to prevent friendly units from firing on one another
as they converge on adjacent objectives.
This simple example contains a total of 20 symtols of 16 diflerent types. In the
evaluated deliberate attacks there were as many as 117 symbols, and as many as 27 dif-
ferent types. Appendices B and C contain definitions, descriptions and representations
of the s.mbols portrayed in this example as well as those which have been omitted.
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D. METHODOLOGY FOR OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS EVALUATION
The evaluation of the operational graphics used at NTC is broken down into a
quantitative and a qualitative research. The questions to be addressed under quantita-
tive research were: Which symbols were used?; How many symbols were used?; and
finally, What types of symbols were used? Qualitatively, the goal was to answer the
questions: Were the symbols that were used drawn correctly?; and, What is the overall
score for the graphics which were used? Questions of the appropriateness of the symbols
selected by the commander and subjective assessment of the commander's overall plan
were not considered in this research.
In an effort to capture all of the information available from the operation overlays,
a distinction was made between company and battalion symbols of the same type. A
significant loss of information would occur if, for example, company objectives and
battalion objectives were combined under one category. As was pointed out in the ex-
ample in the previous section, company objectives are often used as partitions of bat-
talion objectives to aid in the coordination of the fight in the objective area.
1. QUANTITATIVE OPERATIONAL GRAPH4ICS RESEARCH
The individual symbols used on the 30 missions were widely varied. See
Table 8 on page 28 and Table 9 on page 29. A total of 1924 individual symbols and
68 different types of symbols were used. Only three types of symbols were used during
every mission and they were: boundary, phase line, and zone of action. The types of
symbols which were used on only one mission weie: artillery battery, collecting point,
communications checkpoint, forward supply point, ground surxeillance radar, mortar,
and retransmission point. The symbols used most frequently were checkpoints at 532
occurances, phase lines at 187 occurances, targets at 149 occurances, and company ob-
jectives at 131 occurances. A total of 20 symbols could not be defined as to purpose or
type. These symbols were grouped in the "Unknown" category.
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Table 8. OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS USAGE
Symbol SYMBOL Total Maximum Missions
Number Used Used Using
1 Air Axis 10 3 20.0%
2 Air Control Point 23 16 6.7%
3 Air Corridor 4 2 10.0%
4 Air Defense Platoon 2 1 6.7%
5 Antiarmor Company 8 3 13.3%
6 Armor Company/Team 21 5 23.3%
7 Artillery Battery 3 3 3.3%
8 Assault Position 5 3 10.0%
9 Assembly Area (BN) 24 5 50.0%
10 Assembly Area (CO) 20 6 20,0%
11 Attack Position (BN) 8 1 26.7%
12 Attack Position (CO) 30 5 23.3%
13 Main Attack Axis 12 2 36.7%
14 Axis of Advance (BN) 54 6 76.7%
15 Axis or Advance (CO) 36 4 60.0%
16 BN Task Force (Armor) 7 5 10.0%
17 BN Task Force (Mech) 3 1 10.0%
18 Battalion Trains 7 2 16.7%
19 Battle Position (BN) 5 1 16.7%
20 Battle Position (CO) 96 11 63.3%
21 Boundary 33 3 100.0%
22 Brigade Headquarters 7 3 16.7%
23 Brigade Support Area 6 1 20.0%
24 Checkpoint 532 64 83.3 0
25 Chemical Platoon 2 1 6.7%
26 Collecting Point 1 1 3.3%
27 CCP 2 2 3.3%
28 Contact Point 4 3 6.7%
29 Coordinated Fire Line 8 1 26.7%
30 Coordinating Point 26 6 23.30%
31 Decontanination Point 12 4 13.3%
32 Direction of Attack (BN) 4 2 10.0%
33 Direction of Attack (CO) 10 3 16.7%
34 Enemy Platoon 15 9 10.0%
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Table 9. OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS USAGE
Symbol SYMBOL Total Maximum Missions
Number Used Used Using
35 Engagement Area 20 3 43.3% 
36 Engineer Platoon 4 3 6.7%
37 Fonvard Supply Point 1 1 3.3%
38 GSR 3 3 3.3%
39 Infiltration Lane 3 1 10.0%
40 Landing Zone 3 1 10.0%
41 Lane 18 4 23.3%
42 Limit of Advance 7 1 23.3%
43 Line of Departure 18 1 60.0%
44 LD ,LC 8 1 26.7%
45 Link-Up Point 8 4 13.3%
46 Main Supply Route 4 2 10.0%
47 ,Mechanized Company 22 5 23.3%
48 Minefield 15 7 10.0%
49 Mortar 2 2 3.3 0
50 Mortar Platoon 8 1 26.75o
51 Objective (BN) 66 5 96.7%
52 Objective (CO) 131 10 83.3%
53 Observation Post 15 5 20.0%
54 Phase Line 187 11 100.0%
55 Pick-Up Zone 2 1 6.7%
56 Reconriaisance 9 3 20.0%
57 Release Point 14 2 33.3%
58 Restrictive Fire Line 2 1 6.7%
59 Retransmission Point 1 1 3.3'0
60 Route 30 5 50.0%
61 Scout Platoon 4 2 10.0%
62 Sector (CO) 4 3 6.7%
63 Smoke 2 1 6.70
64 Start Point 16 4 36.7%
65 Support by Fire 58 13 50.0%
66 Target 149 47 43.3%
67 Unknown 20 9 13.3%
68 Zone of Action 30 1 100.0%
The wide variety of symbols which were used is not incongruent with present
doctrine on deliberate attack graphics. There is no doctrinal listing of which symbols
must be used. The only doctrinal reference in this area is in [Ref. 4: p. 124] which states
that as a minimum, deliberate attack operational graphics include a line of departure, a
time of attack, and the objective. In addition a commander may assign zones of action,
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axes of advance, directions of attack, routes, phase lines, checkpoints, and fire control
measures. action and a clearly defined objective.
2. QUALITATIYE ANALYSIS
a. Methodology
The standard for all military symbols is contained in FM 101-5-I, Opera-
tional Terms and Graphics. Each symbol is represented by both a written definition and
an example of how the symbol is drawn. In order to qualitatively evaluate the symbols
used during the deliberate attacks, a numerical evaluation methodology was created.
The first step in the development of this methodology was to break each
symbol down into four major components which could then be evaluated on a Go / No
Go basis. As an illustration, the definition for a phase line is, "A line used for control
and coordination of military operations. It is usually a recognizable terrain feature ex-
tending across the zone of action." [Ref. 1: p. 1-55] The depiction of the symbol is as a
solid line with the designation PL DELTA at each end of the line. Additional remarks
with the depiction state, "Phase lines are labeled "PL" and assigned letters, numbers, or
code name designations." [Ref. 1: p. 2-35] From this information the following four
questions were extracted for evaluation.
1. Is the line.oriented to terrain features?
2. Is PL (designation) at both ends of the line?
3. Is there no repetition of designations?
4. Does the line cross the entire sector?
Question 3 is not directly stated in the symbol definition, but is implied in other portions
of [Ref. 1: p. 2-26]. Once these questions were extracted, they were written into a tab-
ular format as shown in Table 10.
Table 10. SYMBOL EVALUATION EXAMPLE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
phase line Is the line oriented to terrain features?
Is PL (designation) at both ends of the line?PL PL
DELTA DELTA Is there no repetition of designations?
Does the line cross the entire sector?
_ TOTAL SCORE
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A depiction of the symbol was added to aid in the evaluation process. Ta-
bles were created for each of 85 possible symbols. While some of these symbols, such
as the bridgehead line, were not used in the evaluated missions, all of the evaluation
forms are included in Appendix C. These forms were created prior to the data collection
process and were not influenced by the actual graphics used on the evaluated operations
overlays.
b. Evaluation Process
The evaluation of the operation overlays consisted of the following six steps being exe-
cuted fbr each type of symbol.
1. Identify all symbols of a certain type, i.
2. Record the total quantity (QUANTITY,) of that symbol.
3. Evaluate each of the individual symbols against the four questions.
4. Record the number of correct (Go) and the number of incorrect (No Go).
5. Compute the score for each question by dividing the number correct by the total
quantity.
6. Total the four scores For the overall symbol score (SCORE), and record.
7. Multiply the overall symbol score (SCORE) by the the total quantity
(QUAAVTIT),), and record.
The result of these procedures is a table similar to Table 11 on page 32.
This example has been reduced to three symbols in the interest of simplicity.
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Table 11. GRAPHICS EVALUATION EXAMPLE
ROTATION: 90 - 12 TASK FORCE: Armor DATE: 7 Dec 90
GRAPHICS EVALUATION FORM
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
axis of advance for main at- Does the symbol have a double arrowhead? 1 0 1.0
tack Is the axis marked with a designation? 1 0 1.0
AXIS Is the axis oriented to the terrain? 1 0 1.0I Is there no repitition of designations? 1 0 1.0
_ _ __ TOTAL SCORE 4.0 4.0
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
checkpoint Is the symbol oriented to a terrain feature? 20 5 0.8
is the symbol drawn as a square and triangle? 25 0 1.0
Is the triangle pointing to the terrain feature? 10 10 0.5
Is there no repitition of numbers? 21 4 0.84
TOTAL SCORE 3.i - 78.5
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
objective Is the symbol drawn as an enclosed area? 4 0 1.0
Is OBJ (designation) in the symbol? 3 1 0.75
OB Is the area recognizable on the ground? 1 0 
1.0
Is there no repititons of designations? 2 2 0.50
TOTAL SCORE 3.25 13.0
Once the table has been completed it is then possible to compute an oper-
ational graphics score (OGS) for the operation overlay using the following equation.
Z SCORE JX QUANTITY)
OGS = 25x =l , where i = symbols I to n
,QUANTITY,
1=1
The constant factor, 25, is the result of diiding through by the maximum symbol score,
4.0, and multipl)ing by 100 to obtain a percentage. The calculations below illustrate the
use of this formula on the table example.
OGS = 25 x (4.0 + 78.5 + 13.0) = 79.51+25+4
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This methodology provides a relatively quick and efficient way to evaluate how well the
symbols for a given operation overlay are drawn.
c. Evahtation Results
The results of this methodology are presented in Table 12. The high and
low scores have been highlighted. The mean score across the 30 missions was 81.11%.
The mean number of symbols utilized was 64 and a mean of 18 different types of sym-
bols were used.
Table 12. OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS SCORES
NO. ROT DATE TASK TOTAL TYPES OF GRAPHICS
FORCE SYMBOLS SYMBOLS SCORE
1 87-03 28 Nov 86 Armor 23 12 82.6100
2 87-03 02 Dec 86 Mech 43 15 86.63,10
3 87-05 07 Feb 87 Armor 39 12 85.29%
4 87-06 03 Mar 87 Armor 60 19 68.770
5 87-06 04 Mar 87 Armor 35 13 56.45%
6 87-07 28 Mar 87 Mech 31 13 75.02%
7 87-07 31 Mar 87 Armor 36 14 81.25%
8 87-08 21 Apr 87 Armor 69 16 75.06%
9 87-12 17 Aug 87 Mech 57 20 94.91%
10 87-14 22 Sep 87 Mech 66 14 72.92%'o
11 87-14 29 Sep 87 Armor 87 16 87.39%
12 88-02 13 Nov 87 Mech 60 16 82.920%
13 88-05 07 Feb 88 Mech 88 21 75.32%,0
14 88-06 29 Feb 88 Mech 76 25 83.95%
15 89-01 16 Oct 88 Armor 34 15 76.49%
16 89-01 19 Oct 88 :Mech 85 14 89.16%
17 89-02 08 Nov 88 Mech 117 21 85.28%
18 89-02 14 Nov 88 Armor 40 18 76.8%
19 89-03 01 Dec 88 Armor 47 19 85.65%
20 89-04 11 Jan 89 Armor 71 23 80.64%
21 89-10 05 Jun 89 Mech 37 19 82.43%
22 89-10 10 Jun 89 Armor 89 27 83.42%
23 89-11 11 Jul 89 Armor 114 22 87.17%
24 89-12 06 Aug 89 Armor 77 21 94.53%
25 89-12 10 Aug 89 Mech 72 23 87.83%
26 89-13 30 Aug 89 Armor 76 22 64.01%
27 89-13 02 Sep 89 Mech 69 22 84.79%
28 89-14 23 Sep 89 Armor 72 21 79.51%,'
29 89-14 26 Sep 89 Mech 63 21 77.39%




The objective of the analysis was to evaluate the possible relationships between unit
performance, as defined by the three measures of effectiveness in Chapter III, and op-
erational graphics as defined quanitatively and qualitatively in Chapter IV. The objec-
tive was not to develop a predictive model of the form, "Using these graphics will
guarantee success on deliberate attacks at NTC." It is important to distinguish between
these two objectives and to recognize the scope of the analysis which follows. This will
prevent the reader from inferring unsubstantiated conclusions from what is presented.
B. OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS SCORE ANALYSIS
In exploring the possible relationship between the measures of effectiveness and the
operational graphics score (OGS) for each observation, nonparametric methods were
first considered. Each observation was assigned a rank from I to 30, where 1 represented
the best score, and 30 the worst, for each of the measures of effectiveness and the oper-
ational graphics score as shown in Table 13 on page 35.
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Table 13. OBSERVATION RANKINGS
NO. ROT DATE DESTROY SURVIVE DEL ATK GRAPHICSMOE I MOE 2 MOE 3 SCORE
1 87-03 28 Nov 86 20 7 14 16
2 87-03 02 Dec 86 29 1 19 8
3 87-05 07 Feb 87 10 14 12 10
4 87-06 03 Mar 87 14 12 13 28
5 87-06 04 Mar 87 9 5 8 30
6 87-07 28 Mar 87 3 19 5 26
7 87-07 31 Mar 87 12 28 20 18
8 87-08 21 Apr 87 27 29 29 25
9 87-12 17 Aug 87 1 10 1 1
10 87-14 22 Sep 87 18 27 22 27
11 87-14 29 Sep 87 2 20 4 6
12 88-02 13 Nov 87 28 4 21 15
13 88-05 07 Feb 88 30 17 30 24
14 88-06 29 Feb 88 17 3 10 13
15 89-01 16 Oct 88 15 24 18 23
16 89-01 19 Oct 88 13 2 3 4
17 89-02 08 Nov 88 5 18 6 11
18 89-02 14 Nov 88 8 13 9 22
19 89-03 01 Dec 88 22 9 17 9
20 89-04 11 Jan 89 21 26 26 19
21 89-10 05 Jun 89 16 30 25 17
22 89-10 10 Jun 89 7 15 7 14
23 89-11 11 Jul 89 19 16 16 7
24 89-12 06 Aug 89 24 25 28 2
25 89-12 10 Aug 89 4 11 2 5
26 89-13 30 Aug 89 11 23 15 29
27 89-13 02 Sep 89 23 22 27 12
28 89-14 23 Sep 89 6 21 11 20
29 89-14 26 Sep 89 25 6 23 21
30 90-04 16 Jan 90 26 8 24 3
Hypothesis testing was then done using both the Kendall Tau statistic and the
Spearman coefficient of rank correlation. The null hypothesis tested under the Kendall
Tau statistic was: There is no association between the MOE and the OGS. The alter-
native hypothesis was: An association exists. In order to test this hypothesis the meth-
odology described in [Ref. 5: pp. 284-2871 was utilized. Each of the matched pairs
(X, 1), where X was the MOE rank and Y the OGS rank, were listed in increasing order
from 1 to 30 by the MOE rank. The number of pairs of Y ranks that appeared in na-
tural order were then totalled to obtain a value for U.
35
The Tau coefficient was then calculated and used to compute the test statistic, Z, using
the following formulae:
T 4UT= n(n- 1)
3n(n - 1)
/2(2,z + 5)
The Spearman coefficent was computed to support the Kendell Tau results. This
procedure was also taken from [Ref. 5: pp. 275-281]. The null hypothesis for this test
was: No association exists between the ranks of the MOE and the OGS. The alternative
hypothesis was: An association exists. The first step was to compute the difference,
D,, of each of the paired observations (X, 1'). Each of the D, values were then squared
and totalled. The coefficient of rank correlation, R was then calculated along with the




?(n 2 + 1)
Z = R ,n - I
The range of values for both the Kendall Tau and the Spearman coefficient are from
-1 to 1. A value of-1 indicates a perfect inverse association, a value of I means perfect
association, and if X and Y are independent both R and T should be close to zero. The
results of these tests are shown in Table 14 on page 37.
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Table 14. NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS
KENDALL TAU
Statistic MOE I MOE 2 MOE 3
T 0.0023 0.2000 0.1494
Z 0.0178 1.5522 1.1596
p value 0.4920 0.0606 0.1230
SPEARMAN'S COEFFICIENT
Statistic MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3
R 0.0220 0.3046 0.2062
Z 0.1186 1.6401 1.1106
p value 0.4522 0.0505 0.1335
From the values of the test statistic, z, the p values were estimated from a standard
normal table. Each p value is the smallest value of a for which the calculated test sta-
tistic would lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis.
The results of the Spearman's coefficient and Kendall Tau statistics indicated that
some level of positive association existed between the ranks of MOE 2 and MOE 3 and
the ranks of the OGSs. In order to further explore this relationship, the MOE scores,
adjusted for force ratio, were plotted against the operational graphics scores in a scatter
plot. The best fitted line was obtained using linear least squares regression as shown in
Table 15 and Figure 5 on page 38. Large values of R1 here would indicate a linear re-
lationship between the MOE's and the OGS's.
Table 15. SYMBOL QUALITY REGRESSION ANALYSIS
MOE NAME R2  Adjusted R2  F Value Prob > F
I DESTROY 0.0008 -0.0349 0.021 0.8858
2 SURVIVE 0.0247 -0.0114 0.684 0.4154
3 DEL ATK 0.0116 -0.0237 0.329 0.5711
No statistically significant conclusions could be drawn from this methodology.
Because unit operational graphics are only one component of many concomitant
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components in unit performance, and because the relationships are not necessafily
linear, the lack of statistically significant results was not surprising.
C. SYMBOL ANALYSIS
The previous analysis indicates that there is some relationship between unit per-
formance and operational graphics performance, the next area for analysis was that of
symbol usage. Was there a relationship between the use of a particular symbol and the
unit performance defined by the MOEs? In order to answer this question, the quantities
of each symbol for each of the 30 observations was regressed against each of the three
measures of effectiveness. Only two symbols whose use appeared to help unit perform-
ance were found. These symbols were the company objective and the company axis of
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advance. The results of the regression are displayed in Table 16 on page 39 and
Figure 6 on page 40.
Use of multiple company attack axis appeared to positively influence unit perform
ance for the survival MOE and the deliberate attack MOE, while the use of multiple
company objectives was similarly related to success for the destruction MOE and the
deliberate attack MOE. These were the only results of any significance found in the
individual symbol analysis.
Table 16. INDIVIDUAL SYMBOL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
COMPANY AXIS OF ADVANCE
MOE NAME R2  AdjustedR 2  F Value Prob > F
I DESTROY 0.0476 0.0136 1.399 0.2469
2 SURVIVE 0.1092 0.0773 3,431 0.0746
3 DEL ATK 0.1369 0.1061 4,441 0.0442
COMPANY OBJECTIVE
MOE NAME R2  AdjustedR 2  F Value Prob > F
I DESTROY 0.1137 0.0821 3.592 0.0684
2 SURVIVE 0.0084 -0.0270 0.236 0.6306
3 DEL ATK 0.1456 0.1151 L 4.773 0.0374
D. USE OF SYMBOL COMBINATIONS
As was stated in Chapter IV, individual symbols only portray pieces of information.
They must be put together in a logical form in order to convey a message. Multiple
stepwise regression was done in an attempt to answer the question, "Was there a small
subset of symbols which could be used to describe the unit performance on each of the
measures of effectiveness?"
The first problem with this methodology dealt with degrees of freedom for the mul-
tiple regression. There were 30 observations to be described and 68 s) mbols with whicn
to do the describing. The largest number of symbols which could be used, and still allow
for the necessary degrees of freedom, was 26. In an effort to reduce the number of
symbols. all unit s3 mbols were consolidated into one category and the unknown s)mbols
were onitted. This reduced the total number of symbols to 53. Alternatixe methods of
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Figure 6. Individual Symbol Scatter Plots
grouping the symbols were examined, but rejected on the basis of a lack of transparency
of results.
Multiple regression, utilizing forward selection, backward elimination, and maxi-
mum R2 was used to analyze the statistical relationship between the symbols and the
MOEs. This was done using the the software described in [Ref. 6: pp. 763-774]. Both
the forward selection and backward elimination process picked the same symbols to de-
scribe the unit performance for each MOE. The maximum R2 procedurL was then ap-
plied to find the "best" model using from 1 to 30 symbols to describe the model. Because
the model was over-parameterized, models beyond 26 variables were discarded.
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Only one method was available for the selection of the "best" overall model, and this
consisted of examining the cumulative R2 plots of the models selected by the maximum
R2 methodology. These plots are shown in Figure 7 on page 42. Computation of ad-
ditional statistics such as Mallow's C, was not possible due to the over-parameterization




SSE, is the sum-of, squares error for a model with p variables plus the intercept, and
it is divided by the mean square error for the full model. If the model is over-
parameterized, the MSE approaches zero, making it impossible to accurately calculate
the C, value.
Because of the problems with degrees of fieedom, the symbols which were selected
for each of the models were omitted from further analysis. What can be used from this
procedure is the fact that for each of the three MOEs, a five variable model was found
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E. QUANTITY OF SYMBOLS
The total quantity of symbols utilized was analyzed to determine if it had any sta-
tistical relationship to the measures of effectiveness. The premise behind this investi-
gation was that a plan with few symbols might be easier to execute; or, on the other
hand, too few symbols may fail to to convey the commander's intent sufficiently for
battlefield success. The total number of symbols used during each battle were plotted
against each MOE in a scatter plot. Figure 8 on page 44 shows the results of this pro-
cedure. The best fit was found using-ordinary least squares regression. "Iable 17 shows
that there was no statistically significant relationship between the number of symbols
used and the measures of effectiveness.
One possible explanation for this is the terrain on which each battle took place.
While the battles used in the analysis were restricted to the Southern Corridor, theie was
a great deal of variation in the size and location of the assigned zones of action. As an
illustration, two zones of action of equal size could have radically different terrain, and
thus different requirements for operational graphics. Similarly, zones of unequal size
might require more or fewer symbols to depict the commander's intent.
Table 17. SYMBOL QUANTITY REGRESSION ANALYSIS
MOE NAME R2  Adjusted R2  F Value Prob > F
I DESTROY 0.0012 -0.0345 0.033 0.8572
2 SURVIVE 0.0000 -0.0370 0,000 0.9840
3 DEL ATK 0.0006 -0.0351 0.016 0.8989
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following hypothesis was presented for evaluation: Giver. a task force deliberate
attack conducted under NTC conditions, there exists a relationship between the opera-
tional graphics used and how a unit performed during that mission. Based on the anal-
ysis presented in Chapter V, there is evidence to support this hypothesis.
The most important relationship demonstrated was the association between unit
performance and operational graphics quality. Both the Kendall Tau and Spearman's
coefficient hypothesis tests showed that a positive association existed between unit per-
formance, as defined by the three MOE's, and the OGS, or how well the operational
graphics were drawn. Although only the p values for MOE 2 was conclusive, when
combined with the fact that there are many concomitant factors impdcting on unit per-
formance, this was considered sufficient evidence that there probably is a relationship
between between the three MOE's and the OGS's.
Another relationship which has been demonstrated concerns the importance of the
company axis of advance and company objective symbols in describing the unit per-
formance across the thirty battles. It has been shown that the quantity of these symbols
had a statistical relationship with higher MOE scores. Both the company axis of ad-
vance and company objective aie symbols which are used to provide detail to subordi-
nate commanders in a tactical plan. It makes sense that the units which provided greater
detail in their plans would perform better than the units which did not. The relationship
which was demonstrated was descriptive and not necessarily causal in nature.
The final relationship betwe,'n operational graphics and unit performance was in-
complete, however; the methodology showed promise for further research. Multiple
stepwise regression demonstrated that the unit performance could be successfully mod-
elled using a subset of live symbols. With more observations, this procedure could be
utilized to identify the most important symbols in defining unit performance over a series
of deliberate attack missions.
While not directly related to the hypothesis, the identification and removal of the
concomitant effect of the force ratio on unit peformance was also demonstrated. The
statistical significance of this effect also points toward a possible area for further re-
search. Other possible concomitant variables are mentioned on pages 12, 13.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The operational graphics evaluation methodology defined and applied in this thesis
can be used to evaluate unit performance in the preparation of operational overlays.
This process could assist deploying units in improving their ability to effectively com-
municate mission requirements and commander's intent. This would result in the cre-
ation of training standards for operational overlays and fill a void in the existing
performance feedback network at NTC. By maintaining the results of these evaluations
at the CTC archive, further research could be done in this area with a focus on possible
revisions in operational graphics doctrine.
In order to exploit the research methodology of this thesis two key things must be
accomplished. Sufficient observations must be collected in order to fully exploit statis-
tical methods such as multiple stepwise regression and Mallow's C, categorical data
analysis, and factor analysis. These techniques, combined with identification and elini-
nation of concomitant factors influencing unit performance (as discaussed in Chapter
III), would provide clearer and more useful results for application to training and doc-
trine.
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APPENDIX A. OPERATIONAL TERMS DEFINITIONS
advance guard The security element operating to the front of a moving force
[Ref. 1: p. 1-1].
air assault Operations in which air assault forces (combat, combat support (CS), and
combat service support (CSS), using the firepower, mobility, and total in-
tegration of helicopter assets in their ground or air roles, maneuver on the
battlefield under the control of the ground or air maneuver commander to
engage and destroy enemy forces. [Ref. 1: p. 1-1]
airborne A force composed of ground and air units organized, equipped, and trained
for primary delivery by airdrop into an area [Ref. I: p. 1-2].
breakout from encirclement An offensive operation conducted by an encircled force.
A breakout normally consists of an attack by a penetration force to open
a gap through the enemy for the remainder of the force to pass. [Ref. 1:
p. 1-12]
combat service support (CSS) The assistance provided to sustain combat forces, pri-
marily in the fields of administration and logistics. It includes administra-
tive services, chaplain services, civil affairs, food services, finance, legal
services, maintenance, medical services, supply, transportation, and other
logistical services. [Ref., 1: p. 1-16]
combat support (CS) Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat ele-
ments, Includes artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, military police, sig-
nal, military intelligence, and chemical. [Ref. 1: p. 1-16]
commander's intent Comnmander's vision of the battle - how he expects to fight and
what he expects to accomplish [Ref. 1: p. 1-17].
concept of operations A graphic, verbal, or written statement in broad outline that
gives an overall picture of a commander's assumptions or inten in regard to
an operation or seriesof operations; includes as a minimum the scheme of
maneuver and tire support plan. The concept of operations is embodied in
campaign plans and operations plans particularly when the plans cover a
series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in suc-
cession. It is described in sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate
commanders to understand what they are to do and how to fight the battle
without further instructions. [Ref. 1: p. 1-181
covering force A combined arms force with a mission to cover [Ref. 1: p. 1-21].
decisive terrain Key terrain is decisive terrain if it has an extraordinary impact on the
nmission. Decisive terrain is rare and will not be present in every situation.
To designate terrain as decisive is to recognize that the successful accom-
plishment of the mission, whether ofllensive or defensive, depends on seizing
or retaining it. The commander designates decisive terrain to coimunicate
its importance in his concept of operations, first to his staff and, later, to
his subordinate commandeis. [Ref. 1: p. 1-221
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defense of a battle position A mission which places a unit in a battle position (BP) to
concentrate its fires, to limit its maneuver, or to place it in an advantageous
position to counterattack. The BP is a general location on the ground. The
commander positions his forces on the best terrain within and in the vicinity
of the BP. The commander may position security forces forward of and
about the BP. He can also locate combat support (CS) and combat service
support (CSS) elements outside the BP. The commander can maneuver his
forces freely within the BP and seize the initiative to maneuver outside the
BP to attack enemy forces. [Ref. 1: p. 1-23]
defense of a sector A mission which requires a defending unit to prevent enemy forces
from passing beyond the rear boundary of the sector, while retaining flank
security, and ensuring integrity of effort within the parent unit's scheme of
maneuver. Initial positions generally are established as far forward as pos-
sible, but the commander may use any technique to accomplish the mission.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-23]
defense of a strongpoint A mission which implies retention of the position at all costs.
Repaeated assaults must be expected and repelled. CS and CSS assets may
be employed outside the strongpoint. [Ref. 1: p. 1-23]
defensive operations A defense is a coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attacker
and prevent him from achieving his objectives. [Ref. 1: p. 1-231
delaying operations An operation usually conducted when the commander needs time
to concentrate or withdraw forces, to establish defenses in greater depth, to
economize in an area, or to complete offensive actions elsewhere. In the
delay, the destruction of the enemy force is secondary to slowing his ad-
vance to gain time. [Ref. 1: p. 1-24]
deliberate attack An attack planned and carefully coordinated with all concerned ele-
ments based on thorough reconnaissance, evaluation of all available intelli-
gence and relative combat strength, analysis of various courses of action,
and other factors affecting the situation. It generally is conducted against
a well-organized defense when a hasty attack is not possible or has been
conducted and failed. [Ref. 1: p. 1-8]
exploitation An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack to take
advantage of weakened or collapsed enemy defenses. Its purpose is to pre-
vent reconstitution of enemy defenses, to prevent enemy withdrawal, and to
secure deep objectives. [Ref. 1: p. 1-311
flank guard A security element operating to the flank of a moving or stationary force
[Ref. 1: p. 1-33].
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) The forward limit of the main battle area
(MBA) [Ref. 1: p. 1-34].
guard operations A guard force accomplishes all the tasks of a screening force. Addi-
tionally, a guard force prevents enemy ground observation of and direct fire
against the main body. A guard force reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and
delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. A guard force normally op-
erates within the range of the main body indirect fire weapons. [Ref. 1:
p. 1-641
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hasty attack An offensive operation for which a unit has not made extensive prepara-
tions. It is conducted with the resources immediately available in order to
maintain momentum or to take advantage of the enemy situation. [Ref., 1:
p. 1-81
hasty water crossings The crossing of a water obstacle using crossing means at hand
or readily available without pausing to make elaborate preparations
[Ref. 1: p. 1-36].
key terrain Any locality or area the seizure, retention, or control of which affords a
marked advantage to either combatant [Ref. 1: p. 1-401.
linkup A meeting of friendly ground forces (such as when an advancing force re-
aches an objective area previously seized by an airborne or air assault force,
when an encircled element breakes out to rejoin friendly forces, or when
converging maneuver forces meet.) [Ref. 1: p. 1-42].
main battle area (NIBA) That portion of the battlefield extending rearward from the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and in which the decisive battle is
fought to defeat the enemy attack. Designation of the MBA includes the
use of lateral and rear boundaries. For any particular command, this area
extends from the FEBA to the rear boundaries of those units comprising its
main defensive forces. [Ref. 1: p. 1-43]
main body The principle part of a tactical command or formation. It does not include
detached elements of the comnand such as advance guards, flank guards,
covering forces, etc. [Ref. 1: p. 1-43]
maneuier The movement of forces supported by fire to achieve a position of advantage
from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the enemy [Ref. 1:
p. 1-441.
movement to contact An offensive operation designed to gain initial ground contact
with the enemy or to regain lost contact [Ref. 1: p. 1-49].
obstacle reduction The reduction or elimination of any natural or man-made ob-
struction that canalizes, delays, restricts, or diverts movement of a force
[Ref. 1: p., 1-51].
offensive operations The offense is a combat operation designed primarily to destroy
the enemy. Offensive operations may be undertaken to secure key or deci-
sive terrain. To deprive the enemy of resources or decisive terrain, to de-
ceive and; or divert the enemy, to develop intelligence, and to hold the
enemy in position. The offense is undertaken to seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative, and as such, is a priciple of war. [Ref. 1: p. 1-52]
passage of lines Passing one unit through the positions of another, as when elements
of a covering force withdraw through the forward edge of the main battle
area, or when an exploiting force moves through the elements of the force
that conducted the initial attack. A passage may be designated as a forward
or rearward passage of lines. [Ref. 1: p. 1-54]
pursuit An offiensive operation against a retreating enemy force. It follows a suc-
cessful attack or exploitation and is ordered when an enemy cannot conduct
an organized defense and attempts to disengage. Its objective is to maintain
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relentless pressure on the enemy and completely destroy him. [Ref. 1:
p. 1-57]
reconnaissance A mission undertaken to obtain information by visual observation, or
other detection methods, about the activities and resources of a potential
enemy, or about meteorologic, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics
of a particular area [Ref. 1: p. 1-60].
relief operations A relief in place is an operation in which a unit is replaced in combat
by another unit. Responsibilities for the combat mission and the assigned
sector or zone of action of the replaced unit are assumed by the incoming
unit. [Ref. 1: p. 1-61]
retirement A retrograde operation in which a force out of contact moves away from
an enemy [Ref. 1: p. 1-62].
retrograde operations An organized movement to the rear away from the enemy. It
may be forced by the enemy or may be made voluntarily. Such movements
may be classified as withdrawal, retirement, or delaying operations.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-62]
screening force A screening force maintains surveillance, provides early warning to the
main body, impedes and harasses the enemy with supporting indirect fires,
and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements within its capability [Ref. 1:
p. 1-641.
sector An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates and for
which it is responsible. Normally, sectors are used in defensive operations.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-641
secure To gain possesion of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and
to deploy in a manner which prevents its destruction or loss to enemy action
[Ref 1: p. 1-64].
seize To clear a designated area and to obtain control of it [Ref. 1: p. 1-65].
strongpoint A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly fortified and heavily
armed with automatic weapons, around which other positions are grouped
for its protection [Ref. 1: p. 1-67].
isithdraisal A retrograde operation in which a force in contact with the enemy frees
itself for a new mission [Ref. 1: p. 1-75].
zone of action A tactical subdivision of a larger area, the responsibility for which it
assigned to a tactical unit; generally applied to offensive action
[Ref. 1: p. 1-751.
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APPENDIX B. OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS DEFINITIONS
abatis A vehicular obstacle constructed by felling trees 1-2 meters above the
ground on both sides of a road so that they fall, interlocked, toward the
expected direction of enemy approach. The trees should remain attached
to the stumps, be at a 45-degree angle to the roadway, and the obstacle
should be at least 75 meters in depth to be most effective. [Ref. 1: p. 1-1]
air assault Operations in which air assault forces (combat, combat support (CS), and
combat service support (CSS), using the firepower, mobility, and total in-
tegration of helicopter assets in their ground or air roles, maneuver on the
battlefield under the control of the ground or air maneuver commander to
engage and destroy enemy forces. [Ref. 1: p. 1-1]
airborne force A force composed of ground and air units organized, equipped, and
trained for primary delivery by airdrop into an area [Ref. 1: p. 1-2].
air control point (ACP) An easily identifiable point on the terrain or an electronic
navigational aid used to provide necessary control during air movement.
ACPs are generally designated at each point where the flight route makes a
definite change in direction and any other point deemed necessary for timing
or control of the operation. [Ref. 1: p. 1-2]
air corridor A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and es-
tablished to prevent friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces
[Ref. 1: p. 1-2].
airhead line A line described or portrayed in an operation order (OPORD) which
marks the outside limit of that part of the airhead to be denied to the enemy
[Ref. 1: p. 1-31.
airspace coordination area (ACA) A block of airspace in the target area in which
friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. It may oc-
casionally be a formal measure (a three-dimensional box in the sky). More
often, it is informal. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous
attack of targets near each other by multiple fire support means, one of
which normally is air. Formal ACAs are established by a separate brigade
or higher level command. Informal ACAs may be established as low as task
force (TF) level. [Ref. 1: p. 1-4]
ambush A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or tempo-
rarily halted enemy [Rel: I: p. 1-5].
anmmunition transfer point (ATP) A point established in the brigade support area
(BSA) to reduce the travel distances of resupply vehicles. Initial stockage
for each brigade ATP is positioned on corps support command (COSCOM)
stake and platform (S&P) semitrailers, and consists of high volume/high
tonnage items as determined by the division ammunition officer (DAO) and
the division colmnander. [Ref. 1: p. 1-5]
assault objectives Key terrain features or installations whose seizure facilitates the
overall accomplishment of an airborne or air assault operation
[Ref. 1: p. 1-71.
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assault position That position between the line of departure (LD) and the objective in
an attack from which forces assault the objective. Ideally, it is the last
covered and concealed position before reaching the objective (primarily used
for dismounted infantry). [Ref. 1: p. 1-7]
assembly area An area in which a force prepares or regroups for further action
[Ref. 1: p. 1-71.
attack position The last position occupied or passed through by the assault echelon
before crossing the line of departure (LD) [Ref. 1: p. 1-8].
axis of advance A general route of advance, assigned for purposes of control, which
extends toward the enemy. An axis of advance symbol graphically portrays
a commander's intention, such as avoidance of built-up areas or
envelopment of an enemy force. It follows terrain suitable for the size of
the force assigned the axis and is often a road, a group of roads, or a des-
ignated series of locations. A commander may maneuver his forces and
supporting fires to either side of an axis of advance provided the unit re-
mains oriented on the axis and the objective. Deviations from an assigned
axis of advance must not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units
without prior approval of the higher commander. Enemy forces that do not
threaten security or jeopardize nission accomplishment may be bypassed.
An axis of advance is not used to direct the control of terrain or the clear-
ance of enemy forces from specific locations. Intermediate objectives
normally are assigned for these purposes. [Ref. 1: p. 1-8]
battalion task force A force generally organized by combining tank and mechanized
infantry elements under a single single battalion commander to conduct
specific operations. A battalion task b,.ce may be tank-heavy, mechanized
infantry-heavy, or balanced, depending on the concept and plan of opera-
tion. [Ref. 1: p. 1-9]
battle position (BP) A defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of
approach from which a unit may defend or attack. Such units can be as
large as battaliontask forces and as small as platoons. A unit assigned a
BP is located within the general outline of the BP. Security, combat support
(CS), and combat service support (CSS) forces may operate outside a BP to
provide early enemy detection and all around security. [Ref. 1: p. 1-10]
booby trap A deN ice designed to kill or maim an unsuspecting person who disturbs an
apparently harmless object or performs a normally safe act
[Ref. I: p. 1-11].
boundary A control measure normally drawn along identifiable terrain features and
used to delineate areas of tactical responsibility for subordinate units.
Within their boundaries, units may maneuver within the overall plan with-
out close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise restricted.
Direct fire may be placed across boundaries on clearly identified enemy
targets without prior coordination, provided friendly forces are not endan-
gered. lndirect fire may also be used after prior coordination. Lateral
boundaries are used to control combat operations of adjacent units. Rear
boundaries are established to facilitate command and control.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-111
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bridgehead line In offensive river crossing operations, the limit of the objective area
when developing the bridgehead [Ref. 1: p. 1-12].
brigade support area (BSA) A designated area in which combat service support (CSS)
elements from division support command (DISCOM) and corps support
command (COSCOM) provide logistic support to a brigade. The BSA is
normally located 20 to 25 kilometer behind the forward edge of the battle
area (FEBA). [Ref. 1: p. 1-12]
bypass Maneuvering around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the
momentum of advance. Previously unreported obstacles are reported to
higher HQ. Bypassed enemy forces are reported to higher HQ.
[Ref. I: p. 1-121
checkpoint A predetermined point on the ground used as a means of coordinating
friendly movement. Checkpoints are not used as reference points in re-
porting enemy locations. [Ref. 1: p. 1-13]
classes of supply The grouping of supplies, by type, into ten categories to facilitate
supply management and planning [Ref. 1: p. 1-14].
collecting point A facility established within the corps or division. A general collecting
point is a facility established for the control of civilians, prisoners, or
stragglers. A maintenance collection point is established to collect equip-
ment awaiting repair, controlled exchange, cannibalization, or evacuation.
May be operated by the user or by intermediate maintenance units.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-151
communications checkpoint (CCP) An air control point that requires serial leaders to
report either to the aviation mission commander or the terminal control
facility [Ref. 1: p. 1-17].
company team A team formed by attachment of one or more nonorganic tank, mech-
anized infantry, or light infantry platoons to a tank, mechanized infantry
or light infantry company either in exchange for or in addition to organic
platoons [Ref. 1: p. 1-18].
contact point A designated easily identifiable point on the terrain where two or more
units are required to physically meet [Ref. 1: p. 1-18].
convoy A group of 10 or more vehicles organized for the purpose of control and
orderly movement with or without escort protection [Ref. 1: p. 1-19].
coordinated fire line (CFL) A line beyond which conventional surface fire support
means (mortars, field artillery, naval gunfire ships) may fire at any time
within the zone of the establishing I-IQ without additional coordination. It
is usually established by brigade or division, but may be established by a
maneuver battalion. [Ref. 1: p. 1-19]
coordinating point A control measure that indicates a specific location for the coordi-
nation of fires and maneuver between adjacent units. They usually are in-
dicated whenever a boundary crosses the forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA), and may be indicated when a boundary crosses report lines or
phase lines (Pl.s) used to control security forces. [Ref. 1: p. 1-20]
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crossing site The location along a water obstacle where the crossing can be made using
amphibious vehicles, assault boats, rafts, bridges, or fording vehicles
[Ref. 1: p. 1-211.
desired ground zero (DGZ) The point on the ground on, above, or below which it is
desired that a nuclear weapon be detonated. The aiming point for the
weapon. [Ref 1: p. 1-25].
direction of attack A specific direction or route that the main attack or main body of
the force will follow. If used, it is normally at battalion and lower levels.
Direction of attack is a more restrictive control measure than axis of ad-
vance, and units are not free to maneuver off the assigned route. It is usu-
ally associated with infantry units conducting night attacks, or units
involved in limited visibility operations, and in counterattacks.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-25]
division support area (DSA) An area normally located in the division rear positioned
near airlanding facilities and along the main supply route (MSR). The DSA
contains the division support cormmand post (DISCOM CP), the HQ ele-
ments of the DISCOM battalions, and those DISCOM elements charged
with providing backup support to the combat service support (CSS)
eliments in the brigade support area (BSA) and direct support (DS) to units
located in the division rear. Selected corps support command (COSCOM)
elements may be located in the division support area (DSA) to provide DS
backup and general support (GS) as required. [Ref. 1: p. 1-261.
drop zone (DZ) A specified area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies
are airdropped by parachute, or on which supplies and equipment may be
delivered by flee fall [Ref. 1: p. 1-27].
encirclement The loss of freedom of maneuver resulting from enemy control of all
ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement [Ref. 1: p. 1-29].
engagement area An area in which the comnander intends to trap and destroy an en-
emy force with massed fires of all available weapons. Engagement areas are
routinely identified by a target reference point point in the center of the trap
area or by prominent terrain features around the area. Although engage-
ment areas may also be divided into sectors of fire. it is important to un-
derstand that defensive systems are not designed around engagement areas,
but rather around avenues of approach. Engagement areas and sectors of
fire are not intended to restrict fires or cause operations to become static
or fixed: they are only used as a tool to concentrate fires and to optimize
their effects. [Ref. 1: p. 1-30]
fallout Radioactive particles produced by a nuclear detonation which fall from the
nuclear cloud in a pattern determined primarily by wind factors
[Ref. 1: p. 1-31].
feint An offensive operation intended to draw the enemy's attention away from
the area of the main attack, which induces the enemy to move his reserves
or to shift his fire support in reaction to the feint. Feints must appear real;
therefore, some contact with the enemy is required. Usualily limited-
objective attack ranging in size from a raid to a supporting attack is con-
ducted. [Ref. 1: p. 1-311
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final coordination line A line close to the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting
and shifting of supporting fires with the final deployment of maneuver ele-
ments. It should be recognizable on the ground. It is not a fire support
coordination measure. [Ref. 1: p. 1-31]
fire support coordination line (FSCL) A line established by the appropriate ground
commander to ensure coordination of fire not under hi. control but which
may effect current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate fires
of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition
against surface targets. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain fea-
tures. The establishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with the ap-
propriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements.
Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the FSCL, without prior
coordination with the ground force commander, provided the attack will not
produce adverse surface effects on, or in the rear of, the line. Attacks
against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the ap-
propriate ground forces commander. [Ref. 1: p. 1-32]
folloM and support force A committed force which follows a force conducting an of-
fensive operation, normally an exploitation or pursuit. Such a force is not
a reserve but is committed to accomplish any or all of these tasks: destroy
bypassed units; relieve in place any direct pressure or encircling force which
has halted to contain the enemy; block movement of reinforcements: secure
lines of communication (LOC): guard prisoners, key areas, and installations;
secure key terrain; and control refugees. [Ref. 1: p. 1-33]
ford A shallow part of a body of water that can be crossed without bridging,
boats, or rafts. A location in a water barrier where the physical character-
istics of current, bottom, and approaches permit the passage of personnel
andlor Nehicles and other equipment that remain in contact with the bot-
tom. [Ref. 1: p. 1-33]
forward arming and refueling point (FARP) A temporary facility that is organized,
equipped, and deployed by an aviation unit commander, and located closer
to the area of operation than the aviation unit's combat service support
(CSS) area. It provides fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment
of helicopter units in combat. [Ref. I: p. 1-33]
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) The forward limit of the main battle area
(MBA) [Ref. 1: p. 1-34].
forward line of own troops (FLOT) A line that indicates the most forward positions of
friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The
FLOT may be at, beyond, and short of the FEBA, depicting the nonlinear
battlefield. [Ref. 1: p. 1-34]
free fire area (FFA) A specific designated area into which any weapon system may fire
without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters
[Ref. 1: p. 1-34].
gap Any break or breach in the continuity of tactical dispositions or formations
beyond effective small arms coverage. A portion of a minefield of specified
width, in which no nines have been laid, to enable a friendly force to pass
through the mlinefield in tactical formation. [Ref. I: p. 1-35]
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group of targets Two or more targets on which fire is desired simultaneously. A group
of targets is designated by a letter-number combination or a nickname.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-35]
height of burst The vertical distance from the earth's surface or target to the point of
burst [Ref. 1: p. 1-36].
holding line In retrograde river crossing operations, the outer limit of the area estab-
lished between the enemy and the water obstacle to preclude direct and
observed indirect fires into crossing areas [Ref. 1: p. 1-37].
infiltration The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either
friendly troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small
groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in
connection with the enemy, it implies contact is avoided. When used in
conjunction with a tactical vehicular march, vehicles are dispatched indi-
vidually or in small groups at irregular intervals to reduce density and pre-
vent undue massing of vehicles. [Ref. 1: p. 1-38]
landing zone (LZ) A specified zone within an objective area used for landing aircraft
[Ref. 1: p. 1-41].
lane A clear route through an obstacle. A lane for foot troops is a minimum of
1 meter in width and may be Further expanded. A foot lane is marked with
tracing tape along its center line. A single lane for vehicles is a minimum
of 8 meters in width; a double lane is at least 15 meters in width. Vehicle
lanes are marked by any means available. [Ref. 1: p. 1-41]
light line (LL) A designated line forward of which vehicles are required to use black-
out lights at night [Ref. 1: p. 1-42].
limit of advance (LOA) An easily recognized terrain feature beyond which attacking
elements will not advance [Ref. 1: p. 1-42].
line of contact (LC) A general trace delineating the location where two opposing forces
are engaged [Ref. 1: p. 1-42].
line of departure (LD) A line designated to coordinate commitment of attacking units
or scouting elements at a specified time. A start line. [Ref. 1: p. 1-42]
line of departure is line of contact (LD/LC) The designation of forward friendly posi-
tions as the LD when opposing forces are in contact [Ref. 1: p. 1-412].
lines of communication (LOC) All the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an
operating nilitary force with one or more bases of operations and along
which supplies and military Forces move [Re[ 1: p. 1-42].
linkup point An easily identifiable point on the ground where two forces conduct a
linkup meet. When one force is stationary, linkup points normally are es-
tabiished where the moving force's routes of advance intersect the station-
ary foxce's security elements. Linkup points for two moving forces are
established on boundaries where the two forces are expected to converge.
[Ref 1: p. 1-42]
main suppl, route The route or routes designated within an area of operations on
which the bulk of traflic flows in support of' military operations
[Ref. 1: p. 1-34].
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minefield An area of ground containing mines laid with or without pattern
[Ref. 1, p. 1-46].
minimum safe distance (MSD) The minimum distance in meters from desired ground
zero (DGZ) at which a specific degree of risk and vulnerability will not be
exceeded with a 99 percent assurance [Ref. 1: p. 1-47].
no-fire area (NFA) An area in which no fires or effects of fires are allowed. Two ex-
ceptions are (I) when establishing headquarters approves fires temporarily
within the NFA on a mission basis, and (2) when the enemy force within the
NFA engages a friendly force, the commander may engage the enemy to
defend his force. [Ref. 1: p. 1-50]
objective The physical object of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain fea-
ture, the seizure and'or holding of which is essential to the commander's
plan, or, the destruction of an enemy force without regard to terrain fea-
tures) [Ref. 1: p. 1-50].
observation post (OP) A position from which military observations (visual, audible, or
other means) are made, or fire is directed and adjusted. and that possesses
appropriate coimnunications; it may also be airborne [Ref. 1: p. 1-51].
obstacle Any natural or man-made obstruction that canalizes, delays, restricts, or
diverts movement of a force. The effectiveness of an obstacle is enhanced
considerably when covered by fire. Obstacles can include abatis, antitank
ditches, blown bridges, built-up areas, minefields, rivers, road craters, ter-
rain, and wire. [Ref. 1: p. 1-511
passage lanes Areas along which a passing unit moves to avoid stationary units and
obstacles [Rel. 1: p. 1-541.
passage point A place where units will pass through one another either in an advance
or withdrawal. It is located where the commander desires subordinate units
to physically execute a passage of lines. [Ref. 1: p. 1-54]
phase line (PL) A line used for control and coordination of military operations. It is
usually a recognizable terrain feature extending across the zone of action.
Units normally report crossing PLs. but do not halt unless specifically di-
rected. Pls are often used to prescribe the timing of delay operations.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-55]
pickup zone (PZ) A geographical area used to pick up troops and or equipment by
helicopter [Ref 1: p. 1-551.
point of departure In night attacks, a specific place on the line of departure (LD) where
a unit will cross [Ref. 1: p. 1-551.
pop-up point (PUP) The location at which aircraft quickly gain altitude for target
aquisition and engagement [Ref. 1: p. 1-55].
probable line of deployment (PLD) A line previously selected on the ground where at-
tacking units deploy prior to beginning an assault; it is generally used under
conditions of limited visibility [Ref. 1: p. 1-57].
radiation dose rate The radiation dose (dosage) absorbed per unit of time. A radiation
dose rate can be set at some particular unit of time (that is, I- 4 1 hour
would be called 1-1+ 1 radiation dose rate). [Ref. 1: p, 1-58]
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rally point An easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can
reassemble,'reorganize if they become disbursed [Ref. 1: p. 1-59].
release point A clearly-defined control point on a route at which specific elements of
a column of ground vehicles or flight of aircraft revert to their respective
commanders, each one of these elements continuing its movement toward
its own appropriate destination. In dismounted attacks, especially at night,
that point at which a commander releases control of subordinate units to
their commanders/leaders. [Ref. 1: p. 1-61]
remotely employed sensors (REMS) Remotely monitored devices implanted in an area
to monitor personnel and/or vehicle activity. A sensor system consists of
REMs, sensor relays, and sensor monitoring equipment. [Ref. 1: p. 1-61]
remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) A remotely piloted airborne reconnaissance, surveil-
lance, and target-aquisition and designation device. RPVs provide timely
and accurate intelligence and locate targets behind enemy lines.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-611
restrictive fire area (RFA) An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into
which fires that exceed those restrictions may not be delivered without prior
coordination with the establishing headquarters [Ref. 1: p. 1-62].
restrictive fire line (RFL) A line established between converging friendly forces (one
or both moving) that prohibits fires or effects from fires across the line
without coordination with the affected force. It is established by the
commander of the converging forces. [Ref. 1: p. 1-62]
route The prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a
specific destination [Ref. 1: p. 1-62].
scatterable mine A mine laid without regard to classical pattern that is designed to be
delivered by aircraft, artillery, missle, ground dispenser, or hand thrown
[Ref. 1: p. 1-63].
sector An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates and for
which it is responsible. Normally sectors are used in defensive operations.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-64]
sensor Equipment that detects and indicates terrain configuration, the presence of
military targets, and other natural and manmade objects and activities, by
means of energy reflected or enitted by such targets or objects. The energy
may be nuclear, electromagnetic (including the visible and invisible portions
of the spectrum), chemical, biological, thermal, or mechanical (including
sound, blast, and earth vibration). [Ref. 1: p. 1-65]
series of targets In fire support, a number of targets and or group(s) of targets planned
in a predetermiined time sequence to support the maneuver phase. A series
of targets is indicated by a code name or nickname. [Ref. 1: p. 1-65]
smoke An artificiallh produced aerosol of solid, liquid, or vapor in the atmosphere
which weakens the the passage of visible light or other forms of
electromagnetic radiation. Smoke is classified in three general categories:
identification smoke, obscuration smoke, and screening smoke.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-66]
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start point (SP) A clearly defined initial control point on a route at which specified
elements of a column of ground vehicles or flight of aircraft come under the
control of the commander having responsibility for the movement
[Ref 1: p. 1-67].
strongpoint (SP) A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly fortified and
heavily armed with automatic weapons. around which other positions are
grouped for its protection [Ref. 1: p. 1-67).
target A geographical area, complex, or installation planned fe- capture or de-
struction by military forces. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installa-
tion, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed.
An area designated and numbered for future firing. [Ref. 1: p. 1-70]
target reference point (TRP) An easily recognizable point on the ground (either na-
tural or manmade) used for identifying enemy targets or controlling fires.
TRPs are usually designated by company commanders or platoon leaders
for company teams, platoons, sections, or individual weapons. They can
also designate the center of an area where the commander plans to distrib-
ute or converge fires of all his weapons rapidly. TRPs are designated by
using the standard target symbol and target numbers issued by the fire
support team (FIST) or fire support officer (FSO). Once designated, TRPs
also constitute indirect fire targets. [Ref. 1: p. 1-71]
traffic control point (TCP) A place at which traffic is controlled either by military po-
lice or by mechanical means [Rel. I: p. 1-73].
turning movenment A Nariation of an envelopment in which the attacking force passes
around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives
that are deep in the enemy's rear. In doing so, it forces the enemy to
abandon his positions, divert major forces to meet the threat, and to fight
in two directions simultaneously. [Ref. 1: p. 1-73]
iiithdraiial A retrograde operation in which a Force in contact with the enemy frees
itself for a new mission [Ref. 1: p. 1-75].
Zoe. acti"o A tactical subdivision of a larger area, the responsibility for which is
assigned to a tactical unit; generally applied to offensive action
[Ref, 1: p. 1-75].
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APPENDIX C. SYMBOL USAGE
DELIBERATE ATTACK NUMBER
SYMBOL 1 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 I TOT
AIR AXIS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 10
AIR CONTROL POINT 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 1 23
AIR CORRIDOR 10 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 4
AIR DEFENSE PLT 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 01 2
ANTIARHOR COMPANY 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 8
ARMOR COMPANY/TEAM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 5 2 0 0 6 1 0 1 21
ARTILLERY BATTERY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 
ASSAULT POSITICN 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
ASSEMBLY AREA (ON) 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 S 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 0 0 0 1 I 24
ASSEMBLY AREA (CO) 10 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 20
ATK POSITION (BN) 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8
ATK POSITION (CO) 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 5 0 0 1 30
MAIN ATTACK AXIS 10 1 0 0 0 01 1 0 00 100001 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 01 12
AXIS OF ADVANCE (BN )1 0 6121111 2 0 1 6 3 2 6 0 2 4 1 0 2 5 2 1 4
AXIS OF ADVANCE (CO) 13 2 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 4 2 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 4 0 01 36
ON TASK FORCE (ARMOR) 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 7
3N TASK FORCE (MECH) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
DATTALION TRAINS 10 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 C 0 00 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 01 7
BATTLE POSITION (BN) 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 v 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 S
BATTLE POSITION (CO) 1 5 0 1 0 0 5 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 II 4 5 It 0 3 7 1 6 6 6 0 6 9 1 96
BOUNDARY I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 11 3
IRIGADE NO (ARMOR) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA 1 0 0 I 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 6
CHECKPOINT 1 0 3 S 13 0 6 5 37 14 37 5 30 42 26 0 55 47 0 7 0 3 8 64 37 22 12 3 IS 10 23 5.'2
CHEM PLATOON/SECTION 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
"COLLECTING POINT 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 00000000001 1
CCP 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 2
CONTACT POINT 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 4
COORDINATED FIRE LINE 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
COORDINATING POINT 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 4 4 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 26
DECONTAMINATION POINT 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 12
DIR OF ATTACK (BN) 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 01 4
DIR OF ATTACK (CO) 12 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 10
ENEMY PLATOON 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1is
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DELIBERATE ATTACK NUMBER
SYMBOL I1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 I TOT
ENGAGEMENT AREA 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ! 020 1 2 2 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 01 20
ENGINEER PLATOON 10 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 4
FORWARD SUPPLY POINT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
GSR 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INFILTRATION LANE 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 3
LANDING ZONE 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
LANE 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 18
LIMIT OF ADVANCE 10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 01 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0001 7
LINE OF DEPARTURE 10 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 18
LD /LC I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 a
LINKUP POINT 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 01 8
MAIN SLPPLY ROUTE 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 4
MECH COMPANY/TEAM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 4 2 0 0 5 3 0 1 22
MINEFIELD 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5
MORTAR 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01
MORTAR PLATOON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 01 8
OBJECTIVE (BATTALION) I 1 1 4 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 I 1 2 4 3 3 5 2 3 4 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 3 4 5 1 66
OBJECTIVE (COMPANY) 1 0 10 6 10 3 6 3 0 2 1 9 6 0 8 3 3 7 7 3 9 3 3 2 4 9 4 4 6 0 0 1 131
OBSERVATION POST 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 15
PHASE LINE 14 4 7 4 7 2 8 8 8 4 6 4 7 9 6 11 4 S 8 6 5 9 6 3 5 8 11 5 7 6 1187
PICK-UP ZONE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -"
RECONNAISANCE 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 9
RELEASE POIT 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 114
RESTRICTIVE FIRE LINE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 1 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
RETRANSMISSION POINT 10 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n 0 1 0 0 0 01 1
ROUTE 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 1 1 3 3 0 2 1 3 1 0 1 2 0 01 30
SCOUT PLATCON 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 01 4
SECTOR (COMPANY) 10 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 4
SMOKE 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 01 2
START POINT 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 I16
SUPPORT BY FIRE 10 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 23 0 0 13 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 6 7 5 3 1 58
TARGET I I 10 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 47 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 S 25 4 0 0 0 9 0 0 31 1 149
UNKNOWN 10 0 0 7 9 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 120
ZONE OF ACTION I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 30
TOTAL PER ROTATION 123 43 39 60 35 31 36 69 57 6b 87 60 88 76 34 85117 40 47 71 37 89114 77 72 76 69 72 i3 91 11924
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APPENDIX D. SYMBOL USAGE
DELIBERATE ATTACK NUMBER
SYMBOL 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
AIR AXIS 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
AIR CONTROL POI1T 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AIR CORRIDOR P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AIR DEFENSE PLT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
ANTIARMOR COPAN 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARMOR COMPANY/TEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARTILLERY DATTERY 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ASSAULT POSITIOR 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
ASSEMBL AREA (NI ) 10.00 0.00 3.00 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
ASSEMBLY AREA (CO) 10.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
AIK POSITICN (CN) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00
ATK POSITION (CO) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
MAIN ATTACK AXIS 1 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.O0 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
AXIS OF ADVANCE (BN) 1 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 3.50 0.00 4.00
AXIS OF ADVANCE (C0) 1 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.33 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00
ON TASK FORCE (ARMOR) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IN TASK FORCE (HECH) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00
BATTALION TRAINS 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BATTLE POSITION (BN) 1 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BATTLE POSITION (CO) 1 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 2.75 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
BOUNDARY 1 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 2.00
BRIGADE HEADOUARTERS 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA 1 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
CHECKPOINT 1 0.00 4.00 3.38 3.85 0.00 2.67 3.60 2.95 3.86 2.73 3.40 3.80 2.74 3.84 0.00
CHEM PLATOON/SECTION 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
COLLECTING POINT 1 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CCP 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
CONTACT POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
COORDINATED FIRE LINE 1 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 0.00
COORDINATING POINT 1 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.67 0.00 3.S0 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
DECONTAMINATICN POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
DIR OF ATTACK (ON) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
DIR OF ATTACK (CO) I 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ENEMY PLATOON 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
62
DELIBERATE ATTACK NUMBER
SYMBOL 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ENGAGEVENT AREA 1 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
ENGINEER PLA
T
OON 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FORWARD SUPPLY POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
GSR 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INFILTRATION LANE 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LANDING ZONE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
LANE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 0.00
LIMIT OF ADVANCE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LINE OF DEPARTURE 1 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 2.00
LD /LC 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LINKUP POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00
MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
MECH COMPANY/TEAM 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MINEFIELD 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MORTAR 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MORTAR PLATOON 1 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OBJECTIVE (BATTALION) 1 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.33 4.00
OBJECTIVE (COMPANY) 1 0.00 3.00 3.17 2.60 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 2.25 3.00
OBSERVATION POST 1 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHASE LINE 1 3.75 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.29 3.00 3.00 2.75 3.67 3.00 3.67 3.75 3.29 3.56 2.7
PICK-UP ZONE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
RECONNAISANCE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RELEASE POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.50 0.00
RESTRICTIVE FIRE LINE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RETRANSMISSION POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROUTE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 ..00 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
SCOUT PLATOON 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SECTOR (COMPANY) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SMOKE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
START POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00
SUPPORT BY FIRE 1 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 2.67 0.00
TARGET 1 2.00 3.70 0.00 3.75 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.81 3.67 3.67 0.00 0.00
UNKNOWN 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ZONE OF ACTION 1 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
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DELIBERATE ATTACK NUMBER
SYMBOL 1 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
A___ EF__E__T_,000.0_0.0_0_0_.000.0_0.0_0.0_000_.000.0 0.0 OOB .000.1
AIR DEFENSE PLT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
AIR AXIS 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00
AIR CONTROL POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.80 0.00 0.00 1.71 0.00
AIR CORRIDOR I0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ANTIARMOR COMPANY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.66 0.00
ARMOR COMPANY/TEAM 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 3.03 3.00 0.00
ARTILLERY BATTERY 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ASSAULT POSITION 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ASSE.BLY AREA (BN) 0.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
ASSEMBLY AREA (CO) 1 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ATK POSITION (NI 1 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
ATK POSITION (CO) 1 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00
MAIN ATTACK AXIS 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00
AXIS OF ADVANCE (BN) 1 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 3.73 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
AXIS OF ADVANCE (CO) 1 4.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 0.00 3.7S 0.00 0.00
BN TASK FORCE (ARMOR) 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.80
BN TASK FORCE (MECH) 1 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BATTALION TRAINS 1 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BATTLE POSITION (BN) 1 0.00 0.U0 0.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BATTLE POSITION (CO) 1 0.00 2.09 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 2.71 4.00 3.33 2.50 3.00 0.00 1.67 3.33
BOUNDARY 1 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00
BRIGADE NO (ARMOR) 1 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0C
CHECKPOINT I 3.62 3.62 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 3.59 3.95 3.77 3.57 4.00 3.00 3.80 3.34
CHEM PLATOON/SECTION 1 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
COLLECTING POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CCP 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CONTACT POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
COORDINATED FIRE LINE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
COORDINATING POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DECONTAMINATION POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
DIR OF ATTACK (BN) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DIR OF ATTACK (CO) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.CO 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ENEMY PLATOON 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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DELIBERATE ATTACK NUMBER
SYMBOL 1 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
ENGAGEMENT AREA 1 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
ENGINEER PLATOON 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00
FORWARD SUPPLY POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSR 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INFILTRATION LANE 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LANDING ZONE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 O.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00
LANE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00
LIMIT OF ADVANCE 1 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LINE OF DEPARTURE 1 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
LD /LC 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 0.00
LINKUP POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MECH COMPANY/TEAM 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 0.00
MINEFIELD 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MORTAR 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MORTAR PLATOON 1 0.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
OBJECTIVE (BATTALION) 1 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.75 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 3.67 4.00 3.80
OBJECTIVE (COMPANY) I S.00 3.14 2.43 4.00 2.78 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00
OBSERVATION POST 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHASE LINE 1 5.64 3.75 3.60 3.13 4.00 3.00 2.33 3.14 2.33 3.60 3.75 3.73 3.00 3.86 3.83
PICK-UP ZONE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RECONNAISANCE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 2.50 0.00
RETRANSMISSION POINT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RELEASE POINT 1 0.00 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
RESTRICTIVE FIRE LINC 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROUTE I 3.00 4.00 3.00 1.33 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 4.00 2.00 2.50 0.00 0.00
SCOUT PLATOON 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SECTOR (COMPANY) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SMOKE 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
START POINT 1 4.00 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 3.75 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
SUPPORT BY FIRE 1 0.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 3.67 3.83 3.71 1.80 3.67 4.00
TARGET 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 4.00 3.76 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.89 0.00 0.00 4.00
UNKNOWN 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ZONE OF ACTION 1 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00
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APPENDIX E. GRAPHICS EVALUATION FORM
This appendix contains the graphics evaluation forms which were used in the data
reduction process. The evaluation sheets are broken down by Points, Lines, Areas,
Routes, Unit Symbols, Crossings, and Battlefield Missions. Some of the symbols re-
presented in this appendix were not utilized by any of the evaluated deliberate attacks.
The evaluation forms are presented, nevertheless, as an insight to the graphics evalu-
ation methodology, and as a guide for future research and application.
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ROTAXTION: TA 7SK FORCE: DATE:
_____ __ ____POINTS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
air control poinit Is the smbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is there no repetitorn of numbers?
Is the s~mbol drawn as a circle?
Are tle leters #ACP in the symbol?li i_
_______________TOTAL SCORE
SY.MBOL COMIPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
ammutifon transfer point Is toe symbol orien~ted to a tei rain feature?
A circle .ththe Class N' symbol and ATP?
Ithe s~mbtoi in the BSN?
Is the location clos to the MSR?
ATP TOA SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go0 Nol SCR QTY
checkpoint Is tile sym-b l oriented to 'a terrain fcatuic)
!s the s~ mbol dra%%n as a square and triangle?
the triangle pc.~nt';ig to thc terrain feature?
Is tticre no repetition o nunibei s? -
___________________ IOTAL SCO RE
SYMIBOL, COMPIONEN FS _ ____Go No SCR QTY
collecting poiAt Is the smnrbil onicd it) z terraint feattate?
s tsmboI near tile '-qR
_________________TOTAL SCORE
S YNd130 CMPNa cEN ITv de~ GoN CR. QTY
is tile sxmbol oramii as a circle'
Atre the letters CC1I In thle S~ mhol'
SYMBOL___ COMPONENTS _ ____ Go No SCR QTY
Is thle teirain feature desi-2nated by a Me
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
POINTS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
coordinating point Is the symbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is the symbol drawn as a circle with an x?
Is the terrain feature at the cross of the x?
Located on boundaries between units?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
decontamination point Is the symbol oriented to a terrain feature?
X Dra% n as a circle with designation'
1 2 ID Is the chemical symbol in the circle?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
Forward arming and refuel- Is the area oriented on terrain features?
nAre the letters FARP in the s)mbol?
Located between FLO r and CSS area of BS-X?
Covered from direct fire and observation?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
linkup point Is the s)mbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is the s~inbol drawn as a square aind triangle?
Is there a dot and number in the s)mbol?
Is there no repetition of numbers?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
passage point Is the smbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is the s.mbol drawn as a square and triangle?
Letters P' and designation in the synmbol?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
point of departure Is the symbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is the symbol on the line of departure?
Is the symbol drawn as a square and triangle?
Are the letters PD in the s~mbol?
TOTAL SCORE
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
POINTS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
pop-up point Is the symbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is the symbol drawn as a circle and a line?
PU Is the aviation symbol in the circle?
i U Is the designation PUP next to the s)mbol?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
rally point Is the symbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is the symbol drawn as a circle and arrow?
Is the arrow pointing to the terrain feature?
RALLY RALLY and a designation in the circle'
es 
_ TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
release point Is the s mbol oriented to a route?
Is the symbol draon as a square and triangle?
Is the triangle pointing to a terrain feature?
Are the letters RP in the smbol?
TOTAl SCORE
SYMBOL CO.MPONENiS Go No SCR QrY
start p9int Is the symbol oriented to a route?
Is the symbol draun as a square and triangle?
Is the triangle pointing to a terrain feature?
Are the letters SP in the symbol?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
strong point Is the symbo! oriented to a terrain feature'
Is there nu repetition of numbers?
Driwo as a closed area %uth radial lines?
Are the letters SP in the symbol?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
traffic control point Is the symbol oriented to a route?
Is the symbol at key locations along the route?
Drawn as a square, triangle and hghtpost?
Is the triangle pointing to the keN location?
TOTAL SCORE
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
LINES
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
airhead lhie Boundaries oriented around the airhead?
Are there coordination points between units?
Unit sizes and designations present?
Is the airhead enclosed by the symbol?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
boun4ary Is the boundary oriented to terrain features?
XX - is the symbol drawn as a solid line?11 7 BDE"
x Is the unit size located on the line?1 9 7 O D E  Are the unit designations present?
1 TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTYSbrIdehead line Broken line with BRIDGEHEAD LINE?
Is the symbol on the enemy side of the river?
Mo 1 ) / LINE ZULU AreOBJ zu. A  objectives included %iithin the symbol?
Does the symbol hae a designation?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
coordinated fire line Is the line oriented to terrain features?
Is the symbol dra%%n as a broken black line?
CFL 52 MECH DIV is the establishing HQ above the line?
120030Z MAY Is the effective D'IG below the line?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
final coordination line Is the line oriented to terrain features:
Is the line close to the oblective?
FINAL FINAL Line designated by FINAL CL at both ends?
CL CL
Easily recognizable on the ground?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
fire support coordination Is the line oriented to terrain featuies?
line Is the s)mbol drawn as a solid black line?
FSCL and establishing HQ abo-e the line?
FSCL 2 CORPS is the DIG effectie below% the line?
050030Z APR 1 OTALSCOR'
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
LINES
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR Q TY
forward edge of the battle is the line oriented to terrain features?
area Is the line bounded by coordination points?
FIs FEBA at each end of the line?
FEBA F Is the symbol drawn as a solid black line?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
forward line of own troops Is the line drawn as a series of arcs?
Are the P.rcs open to the friendly side?
Does the line cross the entire sector?
FLOTC 000 0 FL° Is FLOT at each end of the line?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
holding line Solid line with HOLDING LINE?
0 DING Enclosed area on enemy side of the rier?m HOLDING
LINE Area precludes dinect or observed fires?
M ) BRAVO Does the s~mbol have a designation?
TOIAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
light line Is the line oriented to a route?
Does the line cross the entire sector "
LIs LL %sritten at each end of the line?LL LL
Is the s)mbol drawn as a solid line?
TO I'AL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
advance Is the line oriented to terain features?
Does the line cross the entire sectorO
LOA LOA Is LOA Nritten at each end of the line?
-T Is the symbol dran as a solid line?
x 
_ x TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
line of contact Is the line drawn as t\ko series of arcs?
Are the single arcs open to the friendly side?
W % Are the double arcs open to the enemy side?
I ' " 'Are there coordination points at each end"
TOTAL SCORE
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
LINES
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
lines of communication Is the line drawn along a route?
Arrows to indicate traffic direction?
ALT P Do the lines connect forces and'or bases?
4 If alternating traffic, ALT on the line?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
line of departure Is the line oriented to terrain features?
LD LC Is the symbol drawn as a solid black line?
Is LD at each end of the line?
Does the line cross the entire sector?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMbOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
line of departure is the line Is the line drawn as two series of arcs?
of contact Are the single arcs open to the friendly side?
L 'kW W '.I&DG Are the double arcs open to the 
enen) side?
Is LD LC at each end of the line?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
phase line Is the line oriented to terrain features?
Is PL (designation) at both ends of the line?
P L P L Is there no repetition of designations?
DELTA DELTA Does the line cross the entie sector?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
probable line of deployment Is the line oriented to terrain features?
=Is the sy:nbol dra%%n as a broken line?
BLUE Is PLD at each end of the line?
Is the line close to the objective?P LD ,..........PLD ..
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
restrictive fire line Is the line oriented to terrain features?
Is the symbol dra%%n as a solid red line?
RFL 52 MECH DIV RFL and establishing l-IQ above the line?
170030 Z DEC Is tie DTG effectixe below the line?
TOTAL SCORE
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ROTATION: -TTASK FORCE: DATE:
AREAS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go Nol SCR QTY
airspace coordination area Is the area drawn as a red rectangle?
ACA IAre the letters ACA in the symbol?
23d Moch Div
MIN ALT: 500 IIs the establishing HQ in the symbol?
MAX ALT: 3000
EFF: 281 40OZAPR Are the effectie DTGs in the symbol?____
___ 28203OZAPR 
__ TlOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go Nol SCR QTY
assault objective Is the symbol dra~n as an enclosed area?
Is Ofli (designation) in the symbol?
Is the area recognizable on the ground?(: DIs there no repetitions of designations?-
TOTAL SCORE
SYNIBOL COMP1ONENTIS Go No SCR QTY
assault position Is the symbol drawn as an enclosed area?
Is ASIA' PSN (desianationi in the symbol?
ASLT Is the area bet%%een the LD and the objective?
DELT Is it comered and concealed from the enemy?
M ITOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTIS Go No, SCR QTY
assembly area Is the symbol drawn as an enclosed area?
Is AA (designation) in the symbol?
AAPUMA Unit locations specified within the symbol?
3 lk 28Is the area oriented to terrain fea~tures?
_______________ I MTAL SCORE
SY-MBOL COMIPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
attack position Is the symbol draon as an enclosed arcrn?
Is the s'mnbol the last position behind LD?
ATK Is the s mbo oriented 
to terrain features?
aD ~Is ATK (des.gnation) in the symbol?
___ ___ __ ___ __ TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMNPONENTS Gol No SCR QTY
battle position Is the symbol oriented to terrain features?
Does the symbol have a unit size designation?
BP Is BP (designation) in the symbol?
Is there no repetition of designations?
____________ TOT'AL SCORE
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ROTATION: TTASK FORCE:_ DATE:
_____________AREAS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
brigade support area Is the area oriented on terrain features?Q~ Are the letters BSA in the symbol'!
BSA CS and CSS units identified in the area?
(:E D Is the IISA behind the FEBA?
______________TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL, COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
division support area Is the area oricrited on terrain features?
Are the letters DSA in the symbol?
DSA CS and CSS units identified in the area?
Located behind the brigade rear boundaries?
_______________TOTAL, SCORE
SYMIBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
drop zone Is the symbol drawn as an enclosed area?
Is DZ (desimnation) in the symbol?
DZ ~ Is there no repetition of design-Aions?
BLUE Is the airea oriented to the terrain?
________________TOTAL SCORE
SYMIBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
engagemenit area Is the symbol drawn as an enclosed area?
0womIs FLA (desination) in the s)mbollEA Is there no reetitioni of designations?
Oriented to the terra3in and or TRP?
_____________TOTAL SCORE -
SYMIBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
free fire area Is the area oriented on terrain features?
FFA Are the letters FFA in the svimbol)
a CORPS
0O51030Z0516ZJ Is the~ establishing HQ in the symbol?
~MAY vI
(9 D Are the effective DTGs in the s. mbol?
______________ TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
landing zone Is rnbol dra' n as an enclosed area'
Is L aesignatioiu in the symbol?
LZ Is themL no repetition of designauons'
GREENIs the area oriented to the terrain?
_______________TOTAL SCORE
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
AREAS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
no-fire area Is the area outlined in red with diagonals?
Are the letters NFA in the symbol9
rIs the es:abhshing HQ in the symbol?
Are the effective DTGs in the symbol?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
objective Is the symbol drassn as an enclosed area?
Is OBJ (designation) in the symbol?
Is the area recognizable on the ground?
PREY Is there no repetitions of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
pickup zone Is the symbol drawn as an enclosed area?
Is PZ (designation) in the symbol?
PIs there no repetition of designations?
Y L Is thE area oriented to the terrain?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QI'Y
restrictive fire area Is the area outlined in red?
Are the letters RFA in the symboll
( FA Is the establishing HQ in the symbol?
05100005143 Are the effective DI Gs in the symbol?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
n sector ! Boundaries oriented to terrain features?
Are there lateral boundaries?
to n oX
in x V Is there a rear boundary?
Is the unit size and designation present?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
LD/Lone of action Is there a LD LC'
X X Are there lateral boundaries?
H (OBJ Is there an objecti,e"
Is the uni, size and designation presen?
LO/LC X TOTAL SCORE
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ROTAI ION: -TASK FORCE: I DATE:
ROUTES
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
air axis of advance Drawn as a twisted axis of advance?
Is the symbol oriented to the terrain?
AXIS WO LF >Does the symbol have a designation?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
air c *dor Does the route connect ACPs and'or CCPs?
2 Headings given for both directions of travel?
CORRIDOR (designation) on segments?
a Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
axis of a-vance for main at- Does the symbol have a double arrowhead?
tackl - Is the axis marked with a designation?
TF 2-7 Is the axis oriented to the terrain?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONEN'S Go No SCR QTY
axis of advance Does the symbol have a single arrowhead?
' Is the aWis marked "ith a designation?
AXIS ALPHA Is the axis oriented to the terrain?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
L.irection of attack Is the s)mbol drawn from the LD?
i -- Is the symbol drawn as a single arrow?
Does the symbol point towards the objectuve?
Is the symbol not labeled?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
route Is the symbol drao n as a solid line?
Is the symbol oriented to the terrain?
RT RED RT (designation) on the symbol?
Does the symbol hae an RP, SP?
TOTAL SCORE
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
UNIT SYMBOLS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTYair defense section / platoon Rectangle, arc, and weapon symbol?
.e •Platoon , section size indicator on top?
m- Unit designations on the sides?1 8/1.4 Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
antiarmor company / team Is the symbol drawn as a rectangle and a v?
Company team size indicator on top?
EUnit designations 
on the sides?
is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
armor battalion task force Is the symbol drawn as a rectangle and tread?
Battalion, taAk force size indicator on top?
Unit designations on the sides?
2 - 69 Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
armor company / team Is the symbol drawr ds a rectangle and tread?
IilCompany team size indcator on top?
Unit designations on the sides?
Is unt location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
artillery battery (self- drakn as a rectangle, tread, and ball?
propeled) Cornpany team size indicator on top?
Unit designations on the sides?A 2,10 'A 2-10 Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL I COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
battalion trains Rectangle, unit type, horizontal line?
Battalion Task Force indicator on top)
S2- Unit designations and type on the sides,
Is unit location specified correcuy?
TOTAL SCORE
77
ROTATION: -TTASK FORCE: DATE:
UNIT SYMBOLS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
enemy unit Double rectangle, unit t.pe in the symbol?
Unit size indicator on top?
13MB Unit designations on the sides?32 MPB
Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL. COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
chemical platoon / section Rectangle, crossed beakers, and SMOKE?
Platoon ' section size indicator on top?
ASMK Untt designations on the sides?
Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
mechanized infantry battal- Rectangle, diagonals, Nertical and tread?
ion task force Battalion task force size indicator on top?
rM Unit designations on the sides?
1 B 58 Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
mechanized infantry com- Rectangle, diagonals, vertical and tread?
pany tam Company team size indicator on top?
Ale4
Unit desicnations on the sides?
A 1-58 Is unit location specified correctl,?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
mortar platoon Rectangle, ,read, diagonals, and dot?
00 Platoon swze indicator on top of symbol?
3.7 Unit desi-gnations on the sides?MTR37CI
Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
scout platoon Rectangle, tread, and diagonal?
Platoon size indicator on top of symool?
SCT 2-22 Unt designations on the sides?
Is unit location specified correctly?
TOTAL SCORE
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RCTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
_____ ____ ____CROSSINGS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY_
assault Is the symbol used for a river crossing?
______________Are both sides of the river bracketed?
RIVERIs the location identifiable on the ground?
Designated Assault Crossing?
TOTAL SCORE
SY.MBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
ford Is the symbol used with a water obstacle?
Is the s~mbol drawn as a broken arrow?
- Is the location identifiable on the ground?
Does the arrow indicate dii ection of travel?
________________ TOTAL. SCORE _ _
SYMBOL COMPONENTS -o -oSR T
gap Is the symbol drawn as facing brackets?SC QT
Does the symbol breal: the obstacle?
Is the location identifiable on the ground?
H i Does the symbol hia~e a designation?
_______________ TOTAL SCORE
SY.MBOL CO.MIONENTS Go Nol SCR QTY
lane Dra%%n as a line with inward arrowheads?
Does the s'mbol cross the obstacle?
Is the locatioii ideiitifiable on the ground?
Does the symbol ha,.e a designation?
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ROTATION: TASK FORCE: DATE:
BATTLEFIELD MISSIONS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
airborne force Drawn as a twisted axis of advance?>Does it include airborne unit symbol?
Does the symbol have a derignation?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
air assault Drawn as a twisted axis of advance?
Does it include helicopter symbol?
Does the symbol have a designation?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No S CiR QTY
follow and assume main at- Does the symbol have a double arrowhead,
tack Does the symbol follow an attack axis?
Unit designation in the symbol tail?
" - ---..... S)mbol dra\\n as a broken line?
TO'TAL SCORE
SYMBOL CO.MPONEN I'S Go No SCR QTY
folow and support mission Does the symbol have a single arrohead?
Does the symbol follo%\ an attack axis?
S Unit designation in the s)mbol tail?
Symbol dra%\n as a solid line?
"TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL CO.MPONEN'I'S Go No SCR QTY
observation post Drawn as a triangle?
Does the smbol hae a designation?
Is the symbol oriented to a terrain feature?
Is there no repetition of designations?
TrO'AL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
reconnaissance Draw\n as zig-zag arrows,
Do the arro\ws point to identifiable terrain"
Is the reconnaissance unit symbol included?
Is the unit symbol drawn correcty 9
TOTAL SCORE
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ROTATION: . .tASK FORCE: .. DATE:
BATTLEFIELD MISSIONS
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
smoke Drawn as an enclosed area?
Is the symbol designsted SMOKE?
SMOKE Is the symbol oriented to the terrain?
APRZ Is the date and time present?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
support by fire Drawn as a bracket with an arrow?
Does the symbol have a designation?
Does the arrow specify direction of fire?
0+4-B aIs the symbol oriented to the terrain?
TOTAL SCORE
SYMBOL COMPONENTS Go No SCR QTY
withdrawal Dra%%n as a a battle position or unit synrbol?C Arrow pointing a a>,' from the enem\'
Does the arrow specify the thdrawal route?
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